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The last decades have witnessed the emergence of a large number of devices pervasively 
launched into our daily lives as systems producing and collecting data from a variety of 
information sources to provide different services to different users via a variety of 
applications. These include infrastructure management, business process monitoring, crisis 
management and many other system-monitoring activities. Being processed in real-time, 
these information production/collection activities raise an interest for live performance 
monitoring, analysis and reporting, and call for data-mining methods in the recognition, 
prediction, reasoning and controlling of the performance of these systems by controlling 
changes in the system and/or deviations from normal operation.  
In recent years, soft computing methods and algorithms have been applied to data mining to 
identify patterns and provide new insight into data. This thesis revisits the issue of situation 
recognition for systems producing massive datasets by assessing the relevance of using soft 
computing techniques for finding hidden pattern in these systems. Building upon a case study 
methodology, the thesis work evaluates and compares the performance of three of the most 
known soft computing techniques, namely Artificial Immune Systems, Bayesian Belief 
Networks and Neural Networks when applied to different real-life datasets. These include a 
Wi-Fi network monitoring dataset collected from a wireless Internet Service Provider (ISP) in 
Cape Town, South Africa and a drought monitoring dataset taken from the Trompsburg area 
in Free State province, South Africa. The experimental results reveal the relevance of using 
these techniques in situation recognition as well as the strength and weaknesses of the 
algorithms behind each of these three soft computing techniques.  
Keywords: Situation Recognition, Soft Computing, Data Mining, Artificial Neural 
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1.1. Background Information 
The last decades have witnessed the emergence of large number of devices, both fixed and 
mobile, pervasively launched into our daily lives to produce and collect data from a variety of 
information sources. This data production/collection is used to provide different services to 
different users in a heterogeneous environment involving different applications from different 
fields such as Financial Investments, Health Care, Telecommunications and the World Wide 
Web. These applications are characterised by an influx of large volumes of data. For 
example, according to the World Internet Statistics website, from year 2000-2011 the 
population of internet users has grown by 706.9% in Asia alone, while in Africa this 
population of internet users grew by 2 527.4% between years 2000 to 2011 [41]. A major 
contributing factor to this growth may have been the growth and use of social media like 
Twitter and Facebook. 
According to [55], social websites released statistics relating to activity on social websites 
showing there has been great growth since 2007. Twitter states that in January 2010 they 
were experiencing 50 million tweets a day, which rounds off to about 600 tweets per second. 
Facebook also released statistics saying their users post more than 60 million status updates 
per day, which rounds off to about 700 status updates per second [55]. 
Google search engine in early 2011 released statistics that says it receives 121 million 
searches per hour, which are about 2 million searches per minute and about 34 000 searches 
per second [55]. 
These are massive amounts of data that is relevant to companies’ marketing, product research 
and developments. The data pertains to information about their current and potential 
customers’ online activities. The data can reveal information that answers questions like: 
what are the customers saying about the product? How do they perceive the brand? And 
many other questions that refer to the full customer experience. The World Wide Web is not 
the only domain that is characterised by influxes of large volumes of data. 
A very important and critical example is in disaster management. Natural and man-made 
disasters such as earthquakes, floods, droughts and forest fires pose a challenge to public 
emergency services. In order for stakeholders to respond in a fast and well-coordinated 
manner, information concerning the situation plays a vital role. Stakeholders involved in the 
response may include the police department, health department, department of defence and 
fire department. The information communicated among the departments needs to be captured, 
centralised and well-coordinated.  
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are promising a revolution in the way critical information 
is captured, processed and exchanged [21]. WSNs are made of spatially distributed 












In a typical deployment scenario, sensor nodes can monitor variables like temperature, 
humidity, pressure and pollution. The data variables collected are then collectively sent to a 
central node which has higher computational power for further processing. Data are stored in 
central databases that allow large-scale storage, manipulation and access to data. The data can 
then be translated into information that is useful to the stakeholders and thus allowing and 
enabling response to disastrous situations within a predefined operational time frame. This 
deployment scenario requires methods for situation monitoring, situation awareness and 
situation control. According to [42], the critical aspects of the scenario include “managing 
and controlling sources of information, processing real-time or near real-time streams of 
events, representing and integrating low-level events and higher-level concepts, multi-source 
information fusion, information presentation that maximises human comprehension, 
reasoning about what is happening and what is important”. This whole process can be termed 
Situation Management.   
 
Figure 1.1: Situation Management Domain (adapted from [43]) 
In [43], Situation Management is defined as a “synergistic goal-directed process of  
a) sensing and information collection, 












c) analysing past situations and predicting future situations, and 
d) reasoning, planning and implementing actions so that desired goal situation is reached 
within some pre-defined constraints”. 
The research community in situation management is fairly young as it was launched in 2005 
at its first Workshop on Situation Management (SIMA 2005) in association with the IEEE 
Communications Society Military Communications Conference (MIL-COM).  
This has led to a growing interest among researchers for situation management, and to 
contributions to this field of research. These contributions include the work by Jakobson et al. 
in [43], were an overall “big picture” of situation management is given as represented by 
Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1 above shows the core theories of situation management, its 
contributing disciplines, its associated disciplines and the applications of situation 
management. Core research theories of situation management include Situation Modelling, 
Situation Recognition, and Situation Reasoning. While explaining the research field of 
situation management, Jakobson included other associated stand-alone disciplines such as 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), Information Fusion, Distributed Multi-Agent Systems, Semantic 
Web, Sensor Networks, Self-organising Systems and Human Behaviour. Applications of 
Situation Management are varied and inter-disciplinary. Just to mention a few, its 
applications include Tactical Battlespace Management, Disaster Situation Management, 
Networks & Systems Management, and Infrastructure & Cyber Security Management.  
The research focus of this thesis work lies in Situation Recognition using AI techniques. 
Situation Recognition is the branch of situation management that is concerned with collection 
and interpretation of data. This involves the discipline of data mining, where artificial 
intelligence techniques have been applied.  
Three of the most widely used AI techniques include the Artificial Immune System and the 
Artificial Neural Networks and Bayesian Networks. While these techniques have gained 
success and have been widely used in data mining and soft computing, it is not well known 
which one of them performs better than the other and how do the three techniques perform 
when compared against each other. The data-mining efficiency of these techniques when 
applied to different datasets is also a topic that has been only poorly addressed by the 
research community. These issues are addressed in this thesis work with the attempt to shed 













1.2. Research Objectives and Research Questions 
 
Figure 1.2: Machine Learning Techniques and Case study Application 
The figure 1.2 indicates a hierarchal outline of the three machine learning techniques used in 
the thesis, and the three case study application. The research investigation made out for this 
thesis was carried out as part of a middleware research work for two research projects. These 
include a research project aiming at developing a monitoring tool for a large scale Wi-Fi 
network with the objective of  
 determining which intelligent algorithm performs better for network monitoring and 
intrusion detection 
 evaluating how the algorithm performs under different test cases and network 
thresholds 
 evaluating how the algorithms perform for anomaly and aberrant behaviour detection 
 investigating what kind of information can be mined using the intelligent algorithms. 
The second research project aimed to achieve drought monitoring using datasets collected 
from off-the-shelf sensor devices and professional weather stations located in cities by public 
administrations. As part of the middleware project, we wanted to: 
 determine which intelligent algorithm performs better for the drought-monitoring case 
study 
 evaluate how the intelligent algorithms perform across different Standard 
Precipitation Index (SPI) time scales 
 Investigate what kind of information can be mined using the intelligent algorithms. 
 
1.3. Contribution 
In the research community there has been research or scholar work that evaluates the 
performance of the Artificial Immune Systems, Bayesian Networks and Artificial Immune 
Systems, individually. These evaluations and investigations have been applied to various 












have been attempts to compare and evaluate the performance of the three machine learning 
techniques, to the best of our knowledge at the time of writing this thesis work, there has not 
been work that jointly compare the performance of the AIS, BN and ANN algorithms in the 
context of network monitoring, network intrusion detection and drought monitoring. 
The key theoretical and practical contributions to the research and knowledge of this thesis 
work consist of: 
 determining which computational intelligence technique is better suited for Wi-Fi 
network monitoring, network intrusion detection and drought monitoring 
 providing a machine learning technique that can be used in developing intelligent 
middleware for the context of network monitoring and drought monitoring, and 
 identifying performance parameters and providing a combination of novel designs and 
experimentation methods which other researchers can use and build upon for future 
research. 
1.4. Dissertation Outline 
The structure and outline of the dissertation is as shown by the Figure 1.3. Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation will discuss the background and related scholar research work in soft computing 
and computational intelligence. The chapter will give a comprehensive and contextual 
literature review of the artificial immune systems, Bayesian networks and artificial neural 
networks. The chapter will also look into scholar work that compares performance of the 
three algorithms, which is the aim of this dissertation, in a context of the three case studies 
presented. 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation will give a description of research methods used to carry out the 
research investigations. This includes data-collection methods, experiment methods and 
evaluation methods. The advantages, disadvantages and limitations of the methods are also 
discussed.  
Chapter 4-6 are the three cases study investigations carried out for the dissertation. These 
chapters will give a comprehensive and contextual background and scholar work of each case 
study investigation; the experiment designs are discussed together with the experiment results 
and sub-conclusions. 
Chapter 7 of the dissertation will discuss and summarise findings for the case study chapters 
4-6, and give a conclusion about the research work. The future direction of the research work 




























2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED 
WORK 
 
We are witnessing the emergence of a large number of data-producing/collecting devices 
deployed in our daily lives to provide different services to different applications used in 
different fields such as infrastructure monitoring, network monitoring, business process 
monitoring, crisis management, and other monitoring and management systems. Being 
collected in real-time, this information production/collection process raises an interest for live 
performance monitoring, reporting and analysis to monitor changes in the system, or 
deviations from normal performance. To monitor these changes and/or deviations, there is a 
need for methods that can help with recognising, predicting, reasoning and controlling the 
performance of the system. The activities can be collectively identified as situation 
management [42]. 
 
For situation management to be a success, the data collected from the different information 
sources need to be extracted, summarised and represented in a way that aid decision making. 
Data mining is a process of identifying new patterns and insight into data. In recent years, 
soft computing systems have been applied to the field of data mining and pattern recognition. 
These systems include Artificial Neural Networks, Fuzzy Systems, Evolutionary Algorithms, 
Artificial Immune Systems, Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) and Probabilistic Reasoning, to 
name just a few [48] . 
In this thesis work, we will look into three soft computing systems that are widely used and 
have gained great success in the past [15], namely Artificial Immune System, Artificial 
Neural Networks and Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) when applied to achieve situation 
recognition on two different systems: (a) a Wi-Fi performance monitoring system and (b) a 
Drought monitoring system. These systems and the underlying techniques are described in 
the sections that follow. 
 
2.1. Artificial Neural Networks 
The human brain is a highly interconnected network of about 10
11
 or 100 billion biological 
neurons. This network of biological neurons facilitates important vital human body functions 
like reading, breathing, motion and thinking. Some parts of the neural structures are present 
in the human body since birth, while others are established by experience [58]. 
All biological neural features, including memory, are stored in the neurons and in their 
connections between them. Learning is viewed as a new connection between the neurons or 













Figure 2.1: A schematic drawing of the Biological Neuron [33] 
Figure 2.1 above represents a schematic drawing of the biological neuron. For the purposes of 
this research and for simplicity, the biological neuron is made up of three main components: 
the dendrite, the cell body, and the axon. 
The dendrite is a tree-like network of nerve fibres that carry electrochemical signals from 
other neural cells, into the cell body of the dendrite. (The point of contact between the 
neurons is a synapse). 
The cell body receives incoming electrochemical stimulation/signal from other dendrites and 
will effectively sum up and threshold these signals, and determines the extent to which action 
potentials are produced by the neuron.  
The axon is a single long fibre of a nerve cell that carries electrochemical signals from the 
cell body out of the other neurons; and this is conducted by the synapse, which is a point of 
contact between axon of one cell and the dendrite of another cell, and sometimes contacts 
with muscles or gland cell. 
The neural structure/network continues to develop throughout life and consists mainly of 
strengthening or weakening of synaptic junctions. 
There has been significant research for understanding the functioning of the brain and 
biological neurons, and scientists have long had the desire to understand the brain and 
emulate its behaviour. This has allowed researchers to build mathematical models for the 
biological neurons such that the brain’s working model can be simulated. Researchers 
therefore came up with the idea of the biologically inspired Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANN) [58, 71] .  
ANNs (sometimes referred to as neural networks) are mathematical or computational models 
that get their inspiration from biological neural systems. They are information-processing 
systems with certain computational properties that are analogous to those that are learned 
from the biological neural network. The simplified biological neuron basically receives 
electrochemical signals from another neuron, for processing by allowing a specific action to 
be fired when a certain threshold is reached. In this way an artificial neuron can be seen as 












The ANN is made up of large networks of simple processing units called neurons or nodes 
along with their connections (synapse) in the network. The connection from one neuron to 
another has an associated weight, which encodes the knowledge of the network. 
Figure 2.2 displays the structure of an artificial neuron. The nodes (or neurons) can be seen as 
computational units that receive input to process and produce an output. The processing 
might be simple (as in addition, subtraction, etc.) or it can be a complex computation 
(involving another network). 
The processing is computed using a simple or complex mathematical function, the activation 
function. The activation function is computed using the input from other neurons (nodes) to 
give the output, and may involve a certain threshold depending on the problem domain. 
The connection (synapse) between the neurons indicates an association between them 
(pointing from one neuron to the other). Each connection has a set of weights which encode 
the knowledge in the network.  
ANNs have been used by scientists across a variety of research fields. This includes 
aerospace, banking, medicine and speech recognition, to mention just a few. Across most of 
the fields, different ANN models were used for problem solving as in such cases the problem 
can become complex. There exist several ANN architectures including fully connected 
networks, acyclic neural networks, modular neural networks and feed-forward neural 
networks. It is widely recognised that for complex tasks, ANN models with feed-forward 
multiple layers of neurons are necessary. This ANN model is generally referred to as the 
Multiple Layer Perceptron (or simply MLP) [20].  
 
Figure 2.2: The Artificial Neuron 
The essential structure of the MLP is that of perceptron (or nodes) interconnected in layers 
with the output from one layer forming the input to the next layer. Generally, the model is 
made up of three layers (this may differ from one textbook/author to the next): The input 
layer, hidden layer and the output layer. Figure 2.3 displays a representation of the generally 
used MLP model (three layers), where the output                  
The Input Layers - the nodes at this layer are input nodes; they encode and prepare the raw 












The Hidden Layers – this layer is not directly visible to the input and output layers. The 
nodes or neurons at this layer compute an internal representation of the data. With the use of 
MLP algorithms like the back propagation, the values of the connections (or weights) are 
adjusted accordingly, and algorithms may add non-linearity features, as opposed to linear 
best-fit algorithms that try to minimize the distance between the misclassified or the 
mispredicted. 
The Output Layers – the neurons at this layer encode data representations from the results 
obtained by the computations at the hidden layer [20]. 
In [39], the authors address problems with the classification data mining techniques, and 
attempts to solve these problems using Neural Networks. The approach to data mining 
consisted of three phases: 
 Constructing and training the network  to correctly classify tulles in the given training 
data set to required accuracy; 
 Pruning the network while maintaining the classification accuracy, and  
 Extracting symbolic rules from the pruned network. 
The experiment was carried out on a set of datasets and high quality rules were discovered 
using the proposed approach. 
In [50] the authors propose a Genetic Algorithm approach to instance selection in artificial 
neural networks for financial data mining. The aim was to reduce the dimensionality if data 
and eliminate noisy and irrelevant instances. The proposed technique was applied on an 8 
year (January 1991 to December 1998) technical data and the directions of change in the 
daily Korea Stock Price Index (KOSPI). The algorithm directly removes irrelevant and 
redundant instances from the training data, and thus improves forecasting and analysis for 
financial data.  
 
Figure 2.3: A diagram depicting a typical Multi-Layered Perceptron Model 
In [6] the authors carried out experiments in the Bedup River in Sarawak, Malaysia. In their 
experiments they aimed at improving accurate water prediction without having precipitation 












water levels. They used the Back propagation properties of Artificial Neural Networks to 
predict both the missing precipitation and water levels. The developed model was able to 
estimate the missing precipitation data with 96.4% accuracy, and the estimated data was used 
to further forecast the water levels with 85.3% accuracy compared to the 71.1% accuracy that 
was previously attained with the missing precipitation data. The artificial Neural Network 
techniques can be used in forecasting (prediction) of data, and therefore serves as a good tool 
for predication in situation management. 
The work in [7, 8, 11, 92] indicates ANN being used for anomaly detection on network traffic 
data.  
There has been work done in network intrusion detection using ANN. Authors in [7, 8] 
developed an intrusion detection systems that analysed UDP network traffic packets for 
misuse detection. The neural networks’ MLP algorithm with backpropagation was used, and 
the results reveal a 98.2% training data correlation and a 97.5% test data correlation.  
The authors in [11] have identified Artificial Immune Systems as very promising technique to 
intrusion detection. In their research they developed a system, Elman Networks, which uses 
the Dynamic Back Propagation algorithm. This was applied on the DARPA IDS (Defence 
Advanced Research Project Agency Intrusion Detection Systems) Evaluation dataset. The 
research results reveal that the Elman Networks system had was able to correctly classify 
92.7% of the test instances. 
 
2.2. Bayesian Networks 
Since the invention of the computer, there has been a desire for the computer to perform 
intellectually challenging task. According to [47], solving an intellectually challenging task 
can be characterized as a process of deriving conclusions (new pieces of knowledge) by 
manipulating a (large) body of knowledge, typically including definitions of entities (objects, 
events, phenomena, etc.), relations among them, and observations of states(values) of some 
of the entities.  
Systems that help with performing intellectually challenging task are those with artificial 
intelligence capabilities. One in particular is the Bayesian Networks Systems. 
Bayesian Networks can be described briefly as acyclic directed graph (DAG) which defines a 
factorization of a joint probability distribution over the variables that are represented by the 
nodes of the DAG, where the factorization is given by the direct links of the DAG [47]. 
In the past decade, Bayesian Networks have become a popular representation for encoding 
uncertain expert knowledge in expert systems [37]. They are graphical tools or models for 
modelling causes and effect in many different domains. They are compact networks of 
probability that capture the probabilistic relationship between variables, as well as historical 
information about their relationships [66]. Inference and probabilities can be calculated using 
the Bayes Rule (formula) which states that: The probability of a hypothesis H (involving a set 
of variables) given some observed event (assignments of values to a set of evidence variables 












       
           
    
 
 
To Explain Bayesian Networks paradigm, the following popular example, the “family-out” 
problem, depicted by Figure 2.4 is used. In this example, the family member would describe 
the problem as follows: 
Suppose when I go home at night, I want to know if my family is home before I try opening 
the door. Now, often when my wife leaves the house, she turns on an outdoor light. However, 
she sometimes turns on this light if she is expecting a guest. Also, we have a dog. When 
nobody is home, the dog is put in the backyard. The same is true if the dog has a bowel 
problem. Finally, if the dog is in the background, I will probably hear her barking. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: A Bayesian Network for the Family-Out Problem [10] 
With Bayesian networks, one needs to give prior probabilities of all root nodes (nodes 
without predecessors) and the conditional probabilities of all non-root nodes given all 
possible combinations of their direct predecessors. 
The Bayesian network depicted by Figure 2.4 depicts that 60% of the times, the light will be 
on if the family is out, but 5% of the times, the light will be on even when the family did not 
leave. In this way, Bayesian Networks provide a method to help perform reasoning and 
decision making under uncertainty and acquire knowledge from data/experience and to solve 
problems efficiently and respond to new situations. 
In [2] the authors developed a Bayesian Belief Network, HailFinder, which combines 
meteorological data and BBN models to forecast severe weather in North-eastern Colorado. 












The authors of [45]used Bayesian Belief Networks to develop the System for Automated 
Customer Support Operation (SASCO). This system was developed in partnership with 
Hewlett-Packard for trouble-shooting printing systems. Printers are complex systems with 
several components and trouble shooting is not a trivial task. The SASCO system automates 
this process. 
In [22], the authors developed a system BATmobile for Intelligent Vehicles and Highway 
Systems (IVHS) which aims to substantially reduce congestion and accidents on the roads. 
They used Bayesian Networks for decision making given different conditions that were 
observed. The next section gives a description of the Artificial Immune Systems. 
 
2.3. Artificial Immune Systems 
The Human Immune System (HIS) is a robust, complex network of specialized cells and 
organs that defend the human body against a sea of harmful microorganisms called antigens. 
Building upon its capability of differentiating the cells and molecules of the body into self 
(what belongs) and non-self (what does not belong) [75] and [44], the HIS has led to the 
development of the Artificial Immune System (AIS) computational paradigm that may solve 
complex computational problems. 
As depicted by Figure 2.5, once the body recognizes an invasion by antigens (I-III), the 
immunological response (IV-VI) consists of neutralizing or destroying the invading antigens 
through the release and use of B-cells and T-cells (lymphocytes that originate from the bone 
marrow and play an important role in the immunological response). The B and T-cells will 
then destroy the invading antigens and remove them from the body. 
 
Figure 2.5: A pictorial representation of the acquired immune system mechanism (taken from [17]) 
 
2.3.1. Artificial Immune System (AIS) and Negative Selection 
A biologically inspired computational technique, called Artificial Immune System (AIS) has 
emerged from the HIS metaphor.  The HIS features that are of particularly relevant to AIS 












many AIS mechanisms such as the immune system’s Immune Network Theory, Negative 
Selection mechanism and Clonal Selection Principle to solve real world science and 
engineering problems. The focus of this dissertation lies on the negative selection mechanism 
of the immune system with its application to pattern recognition in Wi-Fi network 
monitoring.  
 
2.3.2. Negative Selection Mechanism 
The HIS mechanism provides tolerance for self-cells, and reacts against unknown antigens. 
The HIS generates antibodies through a pseudo random rearrangement process and undergoes 
a censoring process in the thymus as described by [75] and [44]. Only those antibodies that 
do not bind to the self-protein are allowed to leave the thymus to circulate throughout the 
body to perform immunological functions and protect the body against foreign antigens. This 
mechanism gave developments to the Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) described below.  
 
2.3.3. Negative Selection Algorithm 
In [23], the negative selection algorithm (NSA) was first proposed as a means of detecting 
unknown or illegal strings for virus detection in computer systems. This was inspired by a 
change detection mechanism which is based on the way the human immune system 
distinguishes self cells from non-self. The algorithm follows the two steps shown by Figure 
2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6: (a) Generation of valid detector set (stage 1); (b) Monitoring the protected strings for changes 
(stage 2). (Adapted from [23]) 
a) Generate a set of detectors. Each detector is a string representation that does not 
match any of the protected data (self). This is the censoring stage shown in Figure 
2.6(a). The number of detectors generated will vary according to combination of total 












detector is found, it is added to the detector set. This process is repeated until the 
desired number of detectors is reached or no more detectors are found. 
b) Monitor the protected strings. The AIS continuously monitor for changes in the 
system, by matching encoded instances from the database/system. If a non-self 
detector is activated, the correct action will be taken, thus creating an alert and 
logging this with the monitoring system as show in Figure 2.6(b). 
 
In [14, 24], the authors present a novel detection algorithm that is inspired by the negative 
selection mechanism of the immune system. In this algorithm, there is a distinction between 
the self and the non-self. The algorithms were applied to a simulated cutting dynamics in a 
milling operation [14]. The algorithm continuously monitors the system for deviations from 
the normal behaviour patterns of milling operations. Monitoring of milling operations helps 
ensure safe operations and avoid possible damage to the machine tools. To monitor the 
machines tools, measurements of cutting parameters were collected, like: temperature cutting 
force, torque, vibrations, motor current etc. In these experiments, they found out that the 
proposed algorithm successfully detects the tool breakage, and can also detect noise in 
signals. 
In [16], the authors worked on an immune-based intrusion (anomaly) detection technique for 
a computer network. In this work, they used the negative selection algorithm to detect non-
self behaviour in a computer network, but also used a positive identification technique that is 
based on a nearest-neighbour classification technique. The experiments where performed on 
real intrusion data from the MIT Lincoln Lab, and the algorithms were able to recognize non-
self behaviour in the network. After recognizing the anomaly, this was also preserved in long 
term memory for recognition of other behaviour patterns. 
Similar work in [16, 23, 24, 54] shows AIS used for detection of computer viruses while [81] 
reveals AIS used for anomaly detection in refrigeration systems. 
 
In [13], the authors developed a password authentication system that uses Negative 
Identification techniques as the first line of defence to identify legitimate users. Instead of 
using the original password data profile, a negative database is used to store Anti-Password 
detectors. Anti-P detectors are generated by pre-processing the original password data profile 
using a negative selection algorithm. This idea will be able to eliminate brute-force attacks on 
password database or servers. In their experiments, they found out that the Anti-P size grows 
almost linearly with the number of passwords and almost exponentially with coverage. 
 
The work reviewed in this section is related to pattern recognition and anomaly detection, 
which are important in situation management for any system. The algorithms and techniques 














The literature review presented above only reports on the work done by applying each of the 
individual algorithms to a specific application field, and not applying the three algorithms on 
the same dataset to compare their performances. There has been literature comparing these 
algorithms with other existing methods. The remainder of this section presents a brief review 
of the literature and the work done in that direction. 
[93] Proposed an Immune-inspired leaning technique for building a weather forecasting 
system. This was then compared to artificial neural network on an experiment that used 
weather data for April and May as training data for predicting the June Month (test data). 
Their results reveal that the AIS used for the experiment had a higher forecast accuracy of 
81.0% relative to the 64.0% forecast accuracy of the artificial neural network. 
In [46] Bayesian networks were applied to a problem of predicting sea breezes. In their 
experiments, Bayesian networks are compared to rule-based algorithms, revealing that the 
rule-based algorithms were outperformed by the Bayesian network in terms of predictive 
accuracy. 
In [60] experiments were conducted to compare linear stochastic models: autoregressive 
integrated moving average (ARIMA) and seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average 
(SARIMA) with artificial neural networks. These models where applied to a system for 
forecasting drought using the standard precipitation index (SPI) series data from the 
Kansabati River Basin in West Bengal, India. Their experimental results revealed that the 
ANN is more suited for a longer prediction lead time of four months as it outperforms the 
ARIMA/SARIMA model. The ARIMA/SARIMA models produced good results with up to 2 
months prediction lead time. 
During our literature review, we did not come across a study comparing the three algorithms, 
AIS, Bayesian Network and ANN. In the light of the above, this dissertation sets out to 
investigate performance differences of three case studies based on the three algorithms, 
network monitoring, network intrusion detection and drought monitoring. The methods and 
application of the execution of this investigation are explained in the Research Design 













3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The aim of the thesis work is to evaluate performance of three machine learning algorithms 
and methods by comparing their performance on various datasets. This chapter provides a 
description of the steps and methods used to conduct research in this study, and the findings 
on the evaluation of the three machine learning algorithms on the following datasets: 
1. Large-scale Wi-Fi Network Monitoring in Cape Town, 
2. Large-scale Wi-Fi Network Monitoring with Network Intrusion, and 
3. Rainfall, drought and Standard Precipitation Index data in Trompsburg (Free State, 
South Africa). 
 
3.1. Research Method 
There are various research methods available for one to choose from when conducting 
research. The nature and objectives of the research determine the research method one will 
use to come to a conclusion.  
This research aimed to measure, analyse and compare the performance of three algorithms. 
This was done in the form of programming experiments on three datasets. The research 
methods used for this study therefore took the form of a combination of two well- established 
research methods, viz. case studies and experimental methodologies. These research methods 
are described below. 
 
3.1.1. Case Studies 
Researchers have used case study research over a number of years across a variety of 
disciplines. In [64] a review of a few definitions of a case study was made and the following 
definitions were used: 
 An event, an entity, an individual or even a unit of analysis. It is an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using 
multiple sources of evidence. 
 Case studies are concerned with how and why things happen, allowing the 
investigation of contextual realities and the differences between what was planned 
and what actually occurred. 
The authors in [64] further argues that a case study is not intended as a study of the entire 
system, but is rather intended to focus on a particular issue, feature or unit of analysis in order 
to understand and examine the system. It is useful where one needs to understand some 












The case study research methodology has met with much criticism from the research 
community. Authors in [94] have identified that the case study research methodology has 
disadvantages in that it lacks scientific rigour and reliability. The research method has been 
blamed for “being sloppy and allowing equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the 
directions of the findings and conclusion.”  The most common criticism of the research 
method has been that it provides very little basis for scientific generalisation because of the 
small number of subjects used, and its dependency on a single case exploration, making it 
difficult to reach a generalising conclusion. Case studies tend to be microscopic because of 
their limited sampling cases [90]. However, [94] argues that establishing parameters and 
setting objectives of the research are more important than a big sample size in a case study.  
There are however, advantages to using a case study methodology in research. Most of the 
data used in case study research are used within its own context, i.e. within the situation in 
which the activity takes place. In this way, the researcher can have a holistic view and 
understanding of the broader picture of the entire system. Case studies allow variations, 
therefore can allow for both quantitative and qualitative analysis of data. The use of multiple 
cases from multiple sources of evidence can lead to some form of replication, therefore 
allowing a comparative analysis of case studies and generalisation of findings and results in a 
case study research.  
Looking at the definition and uses of a case study research methodology, it was found out 
that it fits the purposes and objectives of our research. The advantages and disadvantages of 
using the methodology were looked into and assessed.  
 
3.1.2. Experimentation 
In [83], experimentation is seen as a method for exploration and testing theory. They are used 
where theory and deductive analysis do not reach. They probe the influence of assumptions, 
eliminate alternative explanations of phenomena, and unearth new phenomena in need of 
explanations. In this way, they help with induction: deriving theories from observation.  
In natural sciences, experimentation has a few drawbacks. In experimentation it becomes 
hard to identify and control variables that may have influence on results, and it is possible for 
one to have difficulties in coming up with a theoretical explanation of the results [5]. Other 
problems may include having the experiments based on unrealistic assumptions, or some 
researchers may be tempted to manipulate the data, or find it impossible to quantify a variable 
of interest [83].  
Experimentations are mainly used in natural sciences, and according to [5], computer science 
is in fact, ‘not a science’ but a synthetic, an engineering discipline that is concerned with 
making things, be it computers, intangible products like algorithms or software systems. 
Therefore we can conclude that computer science is not a natural science.  
Then again we ask the question: is experimentation suitable for computer science? In [83] the 












hampered. He further highlights the benefits of experimentation in computer science based on 
the following points: 
 Experimentation can help build a reliable base of knowledge and thus reduce 
uncertainty about which theories, methods and tools are adequate. 
 Experimentation and observation can lead to new, useful and unexpected insights and 
open a whole new area of investigation. Experimentation can push into new unknown 
areas where engineering processes slowly, if at all. 
 Experimentation can accelerate progress by quickly eliminating fruitless approaches, 
erroneous assumptions and fads. It also helps orient engineering and theory in a 
promising direction.  
The advantages presented above have motivated us to follow an experimentation 
methodology in our performance study of the algorithms behind our three machine learning 
techniques. 
 
3.2. Sample Data 
The machine learning algorithms considered in our work are used to make performance 
analysis on current events and predictions on future events from current datasets, find hidden 
patterns in these datasets and predict future datasets. Training and testing of machine learning 
algorithms are done using sample data. However, this might lead to re-substitution error, 
where the same data used to train the machine learning algorithms are again used to test its 
performance [91], resulting in overly optimistic indicators of performance. It would be best to 
use a representative data of the total dataset for training and testing (illustrated in Figure 3.1). 

















3.2.1. Challenges and Remedies of using sample data. 
There are challenges facing researchers when using domain sample data for training and 
testing, the most important one consisting of avoiding overfitting and underfitting of data in 
the machine learning process. 
3.2.1.1. Overfitting and Underfitting 
Overfitting refers to the situation in which the algorithm used generates a model which 
perfectly fits the training data but has lost the capability of generalising or predicting for 
those representative instances that did not take part in the training of the algorithms. This 
means that any instance that is outside the training data will not be predicted correctly. 
This occurs when the model is excessively complex, like having too many parameters relative 
to the number of instances in the training data. When the capacity is small relative to the 
number of instances in the training data, this is referred to as underfitting of data [74]. 
To avoid overfitting and underfitting of data, larger datasets and the use of machine learning 
techniques, such as the holdout procedure and the k-fold cross-validation, are required [72]. 
When working with large datasets on machine learning algorithms, one is faced with two 
critical challenges: space in memory and time. Space in memory is important since if the 
dataset is too large to be held in main memory for processing, it is difficult for the machine 
learning algorithms to process from such datasets. Time is another critical challenge since 
some machine learning algorithms do not scale linearly with the number of training instances, 
making it infeasible to train on large datasets.  
When datasets are too large, instead of using the full dataset, one can apply subsampling on a 
small subset of the data for training. However, data is lost when using subsampling. 
Techniques such as the holdout procedure and k-fold cross-validation can also be used, 
making the loss of data negligible. The predictive performance of a learned model often 
flattens out long before all the training data is incorporated into it. This is a behaviour known 
as the law of diminishing returns.  
The holdout procedure and the k-fold cross-validation are techniques that are generally 
accepted for subsampling in large datasets. Their description follows below. 
 
3.2.1.2. Holdout Procedure 
The holdout procedure reserves some data for training and the rest for testing. There may be 
instances where the data used for training or testing is not a representative of the full set, and 
the random-sampling is employed in such a way that all classes are represented in both 
training and testing. This is called stratification or stratified holdout procedure. 
In this process a random sample is chosen for holdout, commonly two-thirds for training and 
the remaining for testing, and this process repeated and the error rates of the different tests 













3.2.1.3. K-fold Cross-validation 
Cross-validation is a statistical technique which is a variant of the holdout procedure, but in 
cross-validation you choose a fixed number of folds (K-folds) or partitions of the data. In this 
technique, training and testing are repeated until each partition is used for both training and 
testing. The error rates for all iterations are averaged to give the final error rate. 
In practice, normally a 10-fold cross-validation is used where the data is randomly divided 
into ten partitions of the full dataset. Each partition takes part in the training and testing of the 
algorithm; this is done ten times. At each step the error rate is calculated and the average of 
all steps is used as final error rate [72, 91]. 
For the purpose of these experiments, the 10-fold cross-validation method is used.  
 
3.3. Domain Knowledge 
Machine learning algorithms perform best when the user knows and understands the domain 
in which the intended algorithms are to be used. It is therefore of utmost importance to get to 
understand the domain knowledge for the success of a machine learning algorithm.  
Data can be classified in many forms, and in most statistics textbooks, data is defined as 
nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio. Nominal values are distinct symbols and they serve as 
labels for data. There is no notion for ordering or distance; in other words, there is no relation 
among the values. Ordinal values makes it possible to rank-order the categories; although 
there is ordering, there is no notion of distance and one can therefore compare the values 
[91].  
Interval values can be ordered and measured in fixed and equal units. This allows the basis 
for measurement and comparison among the values. On the other hand, ratios are treated as 
real numbers, and are values for which measurement points inherently define a zero point 
[91].  
To further understand the domain knowledge for which the use of machine learning 
algorithms is intended, one needs to know and understand the relations between the attributes 
of the data. Statistics books define three types of relationships among attributes, semantic, 
causal and functional.  
In the sematic relationship of two attributes, if one attribute is included, the other should be 
there too. It is therefore known that the two attributes only make sense together. With a 
causal relationship, one attribute causes the other. So to predict the one attribute the other 
attribute must be included to make the prediction meaningful. In functional dependency 
relationships, the dependency of one attribute on another is that if the latter is used, there is 












algorithm may end up producing meaningless, tautological results that may obscure 
interesting patterns in the data. 
It is important for one to consider domain knowledge of the data and context in which the 




3.4. Performance Evaluation of Machine Learning 
Algorithms 
An important measure in machine learning is the measure of performance or evaluation 
criteria for machine learning algorithms. The performance evaluation criterion is very 
important to measure the quality of the function model for the chosen algorithm. There are 
several ways that can be used to measure predictive performance, but the error rate seems to 
be important. It would make sense to evaluate machine learning algorithms based on their 
success of prediction. The error rate measures the overall proportion of errors made in the 
total set of instances [72].  
 
3.4.1. Measures of performance 
In statistical tests, there are two types of errors, type 1 and type 2 [91]: 
 Type I errors: these errors occur when a statistical test rejects a true null hypothesis. 
Also known as false positive (FP). 
 Type II errors: these errors occur when a statistical test fails to reject a false null 
hypothesis. Also known as false negative (FN). 
Other measures (which are desirable) exist, like the true positive (TP) which means rejecting 
the null hypothesis while it is not true; and the true negative (TN), which means not rejecting 
the null hypothesis while the alternative hypothesis is false. 
Accuracy measures include the following: 
 
3.4.1.1. Kappa Statistic  
This is used to measure the success of a predictor, the agreement between predicted and 
observed categorisation of a dataset, while correcting for agreement that occurs by chance. 
[91]. It is calculated using the following formula: 
  
                                 













3.4.1.2. True Positive Rate 
This refers to the function of true positives out of the positive, measured by: 
                        
  
       
 
3.4.1.3. False Positive Rate 
This refers to the function of false positives out of the positives. 
                        
  
       
 
3.4.1.4. Precision 
Another important measure is precision, which measures how many instances classified as 
‘positive’ class are indeed ‘positive’. Examples in information retrieval theory: searching for 
relevant documents, Precision will represent the proportion of relevant documents in the 
results returned. It is measured as follows: 
           
  
       
 
3.4.1.5. Recall 
This measures how well the classifier can recognise positive samples, for example in 
information retrieval theory, searching for relevant documents: Recall will represent the ratio 
of relevant documents found in the search result to the total of all relevant documents. It is 
measured using the formula below: 
       
  
       
 
3.4.1.6. F-Measure 
There is a trade-off between Precision (P) and Recall (R) measures. When one tries to 
improve the first measure, there is often deterioration in the second measure. This is 













Figure 3.2: A typical Precision-Recall Graph 
The problem here is described as a Multi-Criteria-Decision-Making (MCDM). The ‘weighted 
sum model’ is the common method to solve MCDM. The F-measure provides a harmonic 
mean for the MCDM problem, and it is defined by the formula: 
   
     
   
   
    
          
 
3.4.1.7. ROC Area 
Another measure used is the Receiving Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves; these 
indicate trade-offs between true positives rate and false positive rate. The ROC (graph) 
curve’s x-axis represents false positive rate while the y-axis represents the true positive rate. 
The north-west corner of the curve is the ideal place. 
 
Figure 3.3: ROC curves for two machine learning algorithms (taken from [91]) 
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is a measure of the probability of the classifier ranks a 
randomly chosen positive instance above a randomly chosen negative one. The larger the area 












3.4.1.8. Confusion Matrix 
This is a multidimensional matrix with rows and columns for each class. It contains the 
number of elements that have been correctly or incorrectly classified for each class. In a 
confusion matrix, the main diagonal of the matrix indicates the number of observations that 
are correctly classified for each class. Therefore good results will correspond to large 
numbers down the main diagonal and small numbers, ideally zero, off-diagonal elements. 












3.4.2. Graphical Descriptive Techniques 
To describe the algorithm performance measures mentioned above, graphical, numerical and 
tabular statistical methods that help to summarise data and to visually present useful 
performance information will be used. They help to quickly absorb information, observe 
trends and easily interpret data. 
In this study, a combination of interval and nominal data is used. To better describe this kind 
of data, bar charts are used. Bar charts are usually simple and easy to read and understand; 
they enhance the reader’s ability to grasp the substance of the data. They are excellent for 
data comparison, which is the main objective of this study, to compare performance measures 
for the three algorithms. For these reasons, the bar chart and tabular representative techniques 
are better suited for this study. 
 
3.4.3. Evaluating Machine Learning Algorithms’ Performance on the 
same Dataset 
The present study aims to compare performance of the three machine learning algorithms on 
a sample problem to see which is better to use. In other words, the study plans to establish 
whether one scheme is better or worse than another machine learning algorithm on average, 
across all possible training and test dataset in that given domain. 
To accomplish this, there exist statistical tests with confidence bounds that perform 
comparisons given two or more methods trained on the same dataset of the same size. 
For the experiments conducted in this research, the repeated 10-fold cross-validation 
technique was used. Each cross-validation experiment yields a different, independent error 












algorithm is significantly greater than or less than the mean of the other machine learning 
algorithm. The experiment was repeated 5 times for each test case. In total we had 200 
(20*10-folds) iterations of the experiment. The mean algorithm performance measures of 
each experiment’s iteration were recorded and used for comparison. 
The notation, (         ) is used for one machine learning scheme, and (         ) for 
the other machine learning scheme. Their means will be represented by   and  , respectively. 
To determine whether the mean,    is significantly greater or less than the mean,  , we will 
consider the mean’s difference, denoted as    ,            .  
           
           
The null hypothesis states that there is no difference in the two means, while the alternative 
hypothesis states that there is a difference in the means. The two-sided co fidence estimate of 
the mean difference will be used [91]. 




   
 
Where   
  represents the variance difference of   and   samples. 
The variance is estimated and therefore has a student’s distribution with k-1 degrees of 
freedom. Using a given confidence bounds, the null hypothesis can be rejected or the 
alternative hypothesis cannot be rejected [18, 72]. 
For the purposes of this study, the t-statistical test is conducted at the 5% significance level 
and its p-value is then presented. The p-value of a test is the probability of observing a test 
statistic at least as extreme as the one computed given that the null hypothesis is true.  
 
3.5. Software Program and Packages 
As part of the research, software programmes were written, and some already existing 
software programs were used for the evaluation of the three machine learning algorithms and 
how each of the machine learning algorithms perform on each of the three datasets.  
The programs written for this study were written in the Java language. Java is a simple 
language designed to be easy to write, compile and debug. It is an object-oriented language 
centred on the creation, manipulation and collaboration of objects. In this way, Java allows 












Weka 3.0 [25], an open-source Java-based machine learning machine software program was 
used in the experiments.  Weka stands for Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis; it 
was developed at the University of Waikato in New Zealand. It is a collection of state-of-the-
art machine learning and data pre-processing tools. It is designed for experimental data 
mining. It allows one to use methods on new datasets, and it allows statistical evaluation of 
various machine learning schemes on various datasets.  
Microsoft Excel’s Analysis ToolPak is a set of analysis tools provided in the Microsoft Excel 
installation. They are used when developing complex statistical or engineering analyses. 
When provided with data and parameters for each analysis, the tools use appropriate 
statistical or engineering macro functions and then display results in output tables [59]. 
 
3.6. Algorithms Parameter Settings in Weka 
The Weka software toolkit has various machine learning algorithms implemented for data 
mining. In the Weka system one will need to fine tune the parameters of each algorithm and 
the section below will give a detailed description of the Algorithms’ parameters used in the 
experiments [78, 88]. 
3.6.1. Multilayer Perceptron 
For Artificial Neural Networks, the Multilayer Perceptron classifier with backpropagation 
was used for data mining. This algorithm has parameters that can be fine-tuned. They are 
described below. 
 GUl: Brings up a Graphical User Interface (GUI) interface. This will allow the 
pausing and altering of the neural network during training. It provides interface for 
users to connect a new node, select a node, disconnect a node, deselecting a node, etc. 
This variable takes up a Boolean value: True or False. 
For the purpose of these experiments, the value was set to false. 
 Auto-Build: This parameter automatically adds and connects up hidden layers in the 
network. It takes up a Boolean value: True or False. 
For the purpose of these experiments, the value was set to true. 
 Debug: If set to true, classifier may output additional info to the console.  
For the purpose of these experiments, the value was set to False. 
 Decay: This will cause the learning rate to decrease. This will divide the starting 
learning rate by the epoch number, to determine the current learning rate. This may 
help to stop the network from diverging from the target output, as well as improve 
general performance. The decaying learning rate will not be shown in the GUI, only 
the original learning rate. If the learning rate is changed in the GUI, this is treated as 
the starting learning rate. 












 Hidden-Layers: The hidden layer of the neural networks is defined by this option. 
This parameter takes up positive whole numbers, separated by comma, for the number 
of nodes in each hidden layer. It is also possible to use one of the wildcard values:  
o ‘a’ = the average of the number of attributes plus the number of classes,  
o ‘i’ = number of attributes,  
o ‘o’ = number of classes,  
o ‘t’ = the number of attributes plus the number of classes. 
For the purpose of these experiments, the value parameter was set to wildcard ‘a’, 
which is the average number of attributes plus the number of classes. 
 Learning-Rate: This determines the amount by which the weights in the network are 
updated. The parameter takes up number values between 0 and 1. 
For the purposes of these experiments, the value was set to 0.3. 
 Momentum: This option defines the momentum that is applied to the weights in the 
network when it is updated. The parameter takes up a number values between 0 and 1.  
For the purposes of these experiments, the value was set to 0.3. 
 Nominal To Binary Filter: This parameter is used for preprocessing the instances 
with the filter. If there are nominal attributes in the data, the performance of the 
network may improve by preprocessing the instances with the filter. The parameter 
takes up a Boolean value: True of False. 
For the purpose of these experiments, the value was set to true. 
 Normalize Attributes: With this parameter the attributes will be normalized. The 
performance of the network may improve when the attributes are normalized. This is 
not reliant on the class being numeric. This will also normalize nominal attributes as 
well (after they have been run through the nominal to binary filter if that is in use) so 
that the nominal values are between -1 and l. 
For the purpose of these experiments, the value was set to true. 
 Normalize Numeric Class: The class will be normalized if it is numeric by this 
option. The performance of the network may improve when the class is normalized. 
The class will be normalized between -1 and 1. This is only internal; the output will 
be scaled back to the original range. 
For the purpose of these experiments, the value was set to true. 
 Reset: This parameter resets the network with a lower learning rate when the network 
diverges from the target output. When this parameter is set to false and the network 
diverges from the answer, the network will fail the training process and return an error 
message. 
For the purpose of these experiments, the reset value was set to true. 
 Seed: This parameter defines the seed that is used to initialize random generator. 
Random numbers are used to set the initial weights of the connections between nodes 
and for randomizing the training data. 
For the purpose of these experiments, the initial seed value was set to 0, zero. 
 Training Time: This defines the number of epochs that the network will be trained. If 
the validation set is non-zero then it can terminate the network early.  












 Validation Set Size: The percentage of the training set that will be used for the 
validation set is determined by this parameter. The training of the network will stop 
when the times that the error on the validation set gets worse in a row reaches the 
value of Validation-Threshold. When this parameter has the value 0, the network will 
be trained using the value of Training Time. 
For the purpose of these experiments the validation set size is set to the value 0, zero. 
 Validation-Threshold: This parameter is used to terminate validation testing. The 
value here dictates how many times in a row the validation set error can get worse 
before training is terminated. 
For the purpose of these experiments the validation threshold is set to the value 20. 
 
3.6.2. Bayesian Belief Networks 
For Bayesian Belief Networks, the popular NaiveBayes algorithm was used for experiments. 
The Weka system has the NaiveBayes implementation and does not have many parameters to 
configure. The default Boolean parameter settings were used for the purposes of the 
experiments. 
3.6.3. Artificial Immune Systems 
For Artificial Immune Systems, the Artificial Immune Recognition System Algorithm 
(AIRS2) was used. The algorithm had the following parameters:  
 Affinity Threshold Scalar: Affinity is a measure of “closeness” or similarity 
between two antibodies or antigens. In the current implementation of AIRS, this value 
is guaranteed to be between 0 and 1 inclusively and is calculated simply as the 
Euclidean distance of the two objects’ feature vectors. Thus, small affinity values 
indicate strong affinity.  
The Affinity Threshold is the average affinity value among all of the antigens in the 
training set or among a selected subset of these training antigens. The Affinity 
Threshold Scalar is a value between 0 and 1 that, when multiplied by the affinity 
threshold, provides a cut-off value for memory cell replacement in the AIRS training 
routine.  
The measurement provides a means of adjusting the automatic threshold by making it 
softer (less than the mean) or harder (more than the mean).  The effect of softening 
the threshold causes less replacement of best matching memory cells by candidate 
memory cells, and the reverse is true when the threshold is hardened. Common values 
for this user parameter are in the range [0.1, 0.3], which is a significant softening of 
the mean. 
The effect of having the scalar too close to the mean is that too many replacements 
occur, thus squashing the threshold down by to a factor of 10% or 20% of the mean 













For the purpose of these experiments the affinity threshold scalar is set to the value 
0.2. 
 Clonal Rate: an integer value used to determine the number of mutated clones a 
given cell is allowed to attempt to produce. In the current implementation, a selected 
cell is allowed to produce up to (clonal rate * stimulation value) mutated clones after 
responding to a given antigen. This product is also used in assigning resources to a 
cell. Therefore, the clonal rate serves a dual-role as resource allocation factor and 
clonal mutation factor for the cell population. A typical value for the clonal rate is 
approximately 10. 
For the purpose of these experiments the clonal rate is set to the value 10.0. 
 Hyper-Mutation Rate: an integer value used to determine the number of mutated 
clones a given memory cell is allowed to inject into the cell population. In the current 
implementation, the selected memory cell injects at least (hyper-mutation rate * clonal 
rate * stimulation value) mutated clones into the cell population at the time of antigen 
introduction. 
For the purpose of these experiments the hyper-mutation rate is set to the value 2.0. 
 K-Nearest Neighbours: This parameter is only used during the read-only 
classification stage of the algorithm. As has been mentioned, it determines the number 
of best match memory cell s used to vote by majority on the classification of unseen 
antigens (data vectors).  When a tie occurs in the majority vote, the class index with 
the lowest number is always selected, making classification deterministic (as opposed 
to probabilistic or stochastic tie breaking strategies). Common values for the kNN are 
in the range of [1, 7]. 
For the purpose of these experiments the k-Nearest Neighbour is set to the value 3. 
 Stimulation Value: This parameter controls the amount of refinement performed on 
ARBs for an antigen, and thus how closely the ARBs will be to the antigen in 
question. Stimulation values are commonly high, around 0.9. This means that the 
mean stimulation value must be quite high, that is the vast majority of the ARBs in 
the pool must be similar to the antigen. The range for the stimulation value must 
obviously be in the range of [0, 1], given the mean also will have the same range. 















4. REDBUTTON WI-FI NETWORK 
MONITORING CASE STUDY 
4.1. Introduction 
Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) is a wireless networking technology that uses radio waves to 
provide high-speed wireless internet connections. It is based on the family of IEEE 802.11 
standards and builds upon a fast, easy and inexpensive networking approach [87] that uses a 
client-server model where the access point (AP), also called a hotspot, plays the role of server 
while its client devices range from laptop computers, IPADs,  tablets and Personal Digital 
Assistants (PDAs) to smart phones. The Wi-Fi APs broadcast signals to Wi-Fi-capable client 
devices that detect and receive broadcast messages from hotspots within their AP’s range, 
and thus connect to the Internet. 
It has been reported that in 2003, 15 million Wi-Fi adapters for computers and 4.4 million 
access points were sold worldwide. The chart in Figure 4.1 shows that in 2003, there were 
20 000 hotspots in private locations while there were above 60 000 hotspots in public 
locations with a predicted growth of just above 60 000 hotpots at private locations while 
hotspots in public locations experienced a growth of just above 140 000 hotspots in 2005. 
This reveals that overall, private hotspots are outnumbered by public hotspots which are 
growing at a fast rate. In their report, Gartner reveals that in 2004 the number of hotpot users 
tripled and totalled 30 million worldwide and more than 50 percent of notebooks had Wi-Fi 
capabilities [27, 82]. These predictions by Gartner Inc. [28] became a reality and today, 
almost every notebook is equipped with a Wi-Fi card, and smart mobile phones are equipped 
with a Wi-Fi access card. Initially deployed in private dwellings such as homes, schools, 
universities and offices, Wi-Fi has shifted to public hotspots. Firms like (USA’s) T-Mobile, 
AT&T wireless and (in this case study) RedButton Mobile CC have rushed to install public 
hotpots in business locations, airports, hotels, shops and restaurants. 
In the first quarter of 2011, 428 million mobile devices were sold worldwide, indicating a 19 
percent year-on-year increase in mobile device sales. In the first quarter of 2011 smartphone 
sales were 23.6 percent and they are predicted to overtake the market and drive smartphones 
to mass adoption.  Smartphone’s sales had an 85 percent year-on-year increase. This may 
increase the need for more public Wi-Fi hotspots, as predicted by Gartner Inc. [27]. This 
presents a great business opportunity for the Wi-Fi hotspot internet service providers.  
The increased demand for mobile access will drive enterprises (clients) to reduce the number 
of wired networks. This will lead to deployment of large network of Wi-Fi hotspots. The Wi-
Fi hotspots internet service providers will enter into a service level agreement (SLA) with the 
clients. Performance monitoring is an important task upon which large Wi-Fi networks 
depends. This is to ensure that Wi-Fi hotspots internet service providers meet the SLA 














Figure 4.1: Graph showing worldwide public hotspots per location 
The popularity of Wi-Fi technology has led to a large scale deployment of thousands of 
hotspots networks generating huge amounts of monitoring data which require efficient data 
handling methods to analyse and recognise anomalous hidden patterns and implement fault 
tolerance. As traditionally implemented, performance monitoring is based on a reactive 
network approach where the operating system software only warns the network 
administrators when a problem occurs. This approach leads to both the halting of important 
network processes and the hampering of critical business processes of the organization. Pre-
emptive network monitoring provides the potential to prevent the occurrence of faults by 
analysing the status of the network components to create a fail-safe network status or allow a 
smooth migration from a faulty to fail-safe network status. While statistical analysis has been 
deployed in many cases to address the performance monitoring issue, soft computing 
methods are emerging as powerful tools used in anomaly detection and security monitoring 
systems.  
 
4.2. Background and Related Work 
There has been work done in the field of AIS, which has mostly focused on intrusion 
detection, detection of computer viruses and network security [54], [23], [24], and [16]. 
While [81, 81] addresses anomaly detection for a refrigerator system, the works in [23] and 
[24] describe AIS mechanisms to differentiate between self and non-self performance with 
application to a dataset of executable files infected by computer viruses.  
In [13], a security authentication system inspired by the immune system using the negative 
selection algorithm is introduced. This system generates a set of anti-passwords (a negative 
image of the password set) used as a first line of authentication kept separate from the 












common passwords, the authors generated a set of anti-passwords that defined the non-self of 
the password authentication system with the objective of providing a proof-of-concept for 
negative authentication systems using AIS to reduce the effect of brute force attacks on 
authentication systems by hackers. The tool breakage detection tool developed in [14] aims to 
detect tooth breakage in different environments. An implemented negative selection 
technique is successfully used to detect the tooth breakage from dynamic variations of the 
cutting force signal.  
There has also been work done in the field of ANN relating to anomaly and intrusive 
behaviour detection. Experiments in [8] were conducted to find out if neural networks were 
able to recognise activities that represent Denial-of-Service attacks. In this work he evaluated 
the ability of neural networks to recognise new patterns through generalisation. The 
experiments revealed that neural networks achieved a 3.24% error rate, which was 
significantly better than the 15% achieved by the commercial intrusion detection systems. In 
these experiments, the DARPA-Lincoln and the KDD99 datasets [92] were used for 
benchmarking and comparison.  
Feed-forward neural network were used in [79] to distinguish between normal and abnormal 
behaviour in UNIX computer systems. In the experiments the authors used information such 
as command sets, CPU usage, and login host address to investigate the effectiveness of neural 
network at modelling user behavioural patterns. Authors in [95] used self-organising maps 
for detecting intrusive and anomalous behaviour in Unix servers. These maps are also known 
as the Kohonen maps, which are single-layer feed-forward neural networks. In their 
experiments the authors used a tcpdump of packet-capture program that is standard on Unix 
to monitor requests and replies to their Domain Name Server (DNS). 
In [22], the authors developed a system, BATmobile for Intelligent Vehicles and Highway 
Systems (IVHS), which aims to substantially reduce congestion and accidents on the roads. 
They used Bayesian Networks for decision making given different conditions that were 
observed.  
 
The authors of [45]used Bayesian Belief Networks to develop the System for Automated 
Customer Support Operation (SASCO). This system was developed in partnership with 
Hewlett-Packard for trouble-shooting printing systems. Printers are complex systems with 
several components and trouble shooting is not a trivial task. The SASCO system automates 
this process. 
 
In [2] the authors developed a Bayesian Belief Network, HailFinder, which combines 
meteorological data and BBN models to forecast severe weather in North-Eastern Colorado. 
This was one of the first forecasting systems developed using BBN techniques. 
 
Building upon the success of the AIS, NaiveBayes and ANN we would like to implement the 
three machine learning algorithms on a large network of Wi-Fi hotspots and answer the 
following research questions: 












 How do they perform under different test cases and network thresholds? 
 Can these methods detect anomalous and aberrant behaviour? 
 What kind of information can be mined using these machine learning algorithms? 
 
4.3. The Experimental Model 
This experiment in this case study was conducted as part of project for developing a network- 
monitoring tool built to achieve pre-emptive monitoring of a large-scale live ISP network 
operating in the city of Cape Town in South Africa. This section of the chapter will give a 
description of the case study experiment conducted. This includes the experimental network 
and the data collection method and encoding of the data entries used in the experiment. 
 
4.3.1. The Wi-Fi Network 
 
Figure 4.2: The Wi-Fi Network Monitoring Tool. 
As depicted by Figure 4.2, a Wi-Fi network monitoring tool was developed around 
WRT54GL routers with three components:  a storage component, a visualisation component 
and a data collection component. The ‘Storage component’ provides storage for the enormous 
amount of data that is harnessed during network monitoring. A postgreSQL database was 
used for this component. The “Visualisation Component” provides visual display of the 
performance of the network. Google Maps was used as a visual tool as the network monitored 
covered a large metropolitan city of Cape Town. Google Chart Tools were used to visualise 
performance statistics and individual router performance. Of most importance was the ‘Data 
Collection component’ which provided monitoring and data-gathering capabilities for the 













4.3.2. Data Collection Methods 
For the network monitoring tool, two data collection methods were identified for use in the 
network, The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Syslog protocols. The 
section that follows briefly describes the data collection methods, and looks at the advantages 
and disadvantages of using each method. This investigation will include cost or data 
overheads for each data collection method. As in performance monitoring, bandwidth is a 
scarce and very expensive resource, a data collection method that is not bandwidth intensive 
is preferred to a bandwidth-intensive method. Such method will reveal less overhead when 
collecting data 
 
4.3.2.1. Simple Network Management Protocol 
SNMP (RFC1157) is a protocol that is defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force. It is 
used in network management system for monitoring devices that are connected to the 
network. It is used to pull and receive SNMP information from SNMP-enabled devices that 
are attached to the network, providing collection services useful to any administrator. It uses 
a centralised client-server model, as illustrated in Figure 4.3; it allows management systems 
(software collecting the SNMP information) to poll agents running on the network devices 
(switches, routers, gateways, etc.) for specific pieces of information. This information may 
include bandwidth, uptime, temperature on device, and many other metrics that can be used 
[77]. 
All SNMP-enabled devices contain a specific text-file called the Management Information 
Base (MIB). It is a collection of hierarchically organised information that defines what 
specific data can be collected from that particular device. SNMP will access information on a 
particular device that its MIB describes. MIB compilers convert these text-based MIB 
modules into a format usable by SNMP management stations. With this information, the 
SNMP management station queries the device using different commands to obtain device-
specific information. SNMP is non-proprietary and commonly used by network 
administrators. It is a standard, one-management system that can communicate with devices 
from multiple vendors [77]. 
 
Figure 4.3: Centralized Client-Server Model 
4.3.2.1.1. The SNMP Message 
SNMP is simple because it uses five basic messages to communicate between the manager 












 GetRequest and GetNextRequest: This allows the manager to send a request for 
information for certain variables; thus, it reads information from the agent; 
 SetRequest: This allows the manager to request a change in a specific variable of the 
agent; this information is then updated to the agent’s MIB; 
 GetResponse: This is sent by the agent to the manager in response to a GetRequest, 
GetNextRequest or a SetRequest message. This message contains the requested 
values, or it confirms that changes were made, or it may contain any error indication 
of previous requests;  and  
 Trap: This type of message allows the agent to asynchronously notify the manager of 
any significant event or changes. 
The SNMP message has a variable binding part (variable size of message); this allows the 
manager to group a number of operations (get, set, trap) into a single message (sending a 
single message requesting all values at a single agent). 
 
4.3.2.1.2. SNMP Security 
SNMP has the following security threats when used:  
 Masquerade    An unauthorised entity may attempt to perform management operations 
by assuming the identity of an authorised entity.  
 Modification of information    An entity may alter an in-transit message generated by 
an authorized entity  
 Message Sequence    Messages may not be received in sequence, they may be delayed 
or duplicated.  
 Denial-of-Service – An attacker may prevent exchanges between a manager and an 
agent  
 
Mitigation Strategies:  
SNMP has the following security services [77]:  
 Data Integrity – ensures that the messages are received as sent, with no duplication, 
insertion, modification, sequencing or replays.  
 Data-origin authentication    provides for the confirmation of a messages source  
 Data confidentiality – this assures that the information is not made available or 
disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities or processes. 
 
4.3.2.1.3. SNMP Overheads 
The SNMP version only consumes 1 byte. The Community String is used as a relationship 












characteristics. Each community is given a name that is unique, within the agent, and this is 
included in each message. The Community String has a length of 7 bytes [77].  
The PDU type defines the type of messages that is sent: this is 1 byte [0-4]  [77].  
 0-GetRequest;  
 1-GetNextRequest;  
 2-GetResponse;  
 3-SetResponse;  
 4- Trap.  
The SNMP PDU starts with the Request ID, which is a 4-byte integer value that uniquely 
identifies each query sent to the device, and the response received from the device should 
contain the matching Request-ID.  
Error-Status and the Error Index are both 1-byte integers. They contain a zero for a 
GetRequest PDU, and for others PDU’s it will indicate whether an error has occurred in the 
SNMP transaction, and what kind of error has occurred. 
Variable-Binding is a sequence of two specific fields. The first field is the Object ID 
(provided by the MIB), which addresses a specific parameter; the second field contains the 
value of that specific parameter. The Object ID is a list of numbers separated by periods, for 
example ‘1.3.1.6.1.4.1.2680.1.2.7.3.2.0’ and this is calculated in a special way such that it fits 
in 13 bytes. When sending a request (GetRequest and a GetNextRequest) to the SNMP agent, 
the value of the specific parameter is set to null; the value will change with a GetResponse 
and SetResponse.  
The value can be an integer and a string or can take any form; therefore it has a variable size. 
Now let us look at how messages may be presented in our project. In one message we can 
request more than one parameter, so we are going to use the bulk-sending functionality of 
SNMP. Every hour, the SNMP Manager will request the following data from the SNMP 
agent: Uptime, Load Average, Radio Noise and Wireless Scan. 
Therefore there will be a sequence of four parameter and values in the SNMP message. 
Therefore message size for a GetRequest: SNMP version. + Community String + PDU Type 
+ Request-ID + Error-Status + Error-Index + Variable Binding 1 byte + 7 bytes + 1 byte + 1 
byte + 1 byte + 1 byte + 1bytes + 4*(13 + 0) = 65 bytes in one direction The GetResponse 
message from the agent to the manager: The agent will respond with the values of the 
requested parameters.  
Each parameter value may be in different types (integer, string etc.); the integer is 10 bytes 
(maximum number) while a string can be less than 255bytes (maximum length of a string). 
The values we are trying to pull from the SNMP agents are integer numbers; therefore they 
should not exceed 10 bytes per value. Therefore the message size should be: 1 byte + 7 bytes 












These messages are wrapped in a UDP packet for transportation, and a UDP packet is made 
of four fields: the Source Port (4 bytes), Destination Port (4 bytes), Length (8 bytes), the 
Checksum (2 bytes) and the data part (total is 18 bytes).  
Therefore total one-way length of a message is 65 + 18 bytes = 83 bytes, while the length of a 
response is 105 + 18 bytes = 123bytes. The total bandwidth used to pull data from an SNMP 
agent is 83 bytes + 123 bytes = 206 bytes.  
We assume a 31-day month, and these measurements will be pulled every hour, therefore: 31 
days * 206 bytes message/hour * 24 hours/day = 153264 bytes (~149.7KB = 0.14MB) per 
month per month. 
 
4.3.2.2. Syslog Protocol 
Syslog (RFC5424) is also a client-server protocol that provides a framework under which 
machines (agents) can send event notification messages across an IP networks to event 
message collectors  also known as Syslog Servers or Syslog Daemons. Each message is a 
single line of text with an associated facility and severity. The facility can be thought of as a 
category that depends upon the program from which the message originates. Severities are 
hierarchical and range from the most important down to the least significant. The facility and 
severity of the Syslog protocol allows one to define how particular severities and facilities of 
messages are logged.  
Initially Syslog messages are stored locally; and these messages will be automatically routed 
to a central location. These messages are received by the logging host; the logging host has 
significant disk storage for incoming messages (stored in a database) [29, 53]. 
 
4.3.2.2.1. The Syslog Message 
The Syslog message body has three parts [69]:  
 PRI – this represents the priority and the severity and facility of the message 
(identifies the source of the message).  
 Header – this part of the message consists of timestamps followed by an indication of 
the hostname IP address of the device.  
 Message (MSG) – contains additional information of the process that generated the 
message and the text of the message.  
According to the [69], the maximum size of a Syslog message is not more than 1024 bytes 
(1KB). 
 












The Syslog message can be encrypted through Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) to provide security and data integrity.  
 Message length  In Syslog, the message length must not exceed 1024 bytes; if the 
message is greater than 1024 bytes, the receiver may malfunction upon receipt of the 
message. The received message may be logged completely, partially, or just discarded 
altogether [29, 53].  
 Message Authenticity    The Syslog delivery mechanism does not strongly associate 
the message with the message sender. The receiver of that packet will not be able to 
ascertain that the message was indeed sent from the reported sender, or if the packet 
was sent from another device [29, 53]. This drawback of Syslog may lead to Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attacks.  
 Message Forgery   Malicious exploits of this behaviour has also been noted. An 
attacker may transmit Syslog messages (either from the machine from which the 
messages are purportedly sent or from any other machine) to a collector [29, 53]. This 
can also lead to DoS attacks. 
 Message sequencing   The Syslog process and protocol do not ensure ordered 
delivery. 
 
4.3.2.2.3. Syslog Overheads 
We now look at the overhead and the bandwidth consumption of the Syslog method. An 
example of a Syslog packet:  
“stat: version=v1.0beta2 lanip=172.25.0.1 noise=-9405/4 uptload=1:52/0.01 
usage=2532952/3876804“ 
This packet contains the following data: firmware version, IP address of LAN interface, noise 
(average over an hour), and uptime/15 minutes load average, and usage (Receive/Transmit of 
a WAN interface). The total length of this UDP packet is 142 bytes. Therefore the total 
bandwidth used in a month (also assuming a 31-day month) is: 31 days * 142 bytes 
message/hour * 24 hours/day = 105648 bytes (~103.2KB = 0.10MB) per month. 
 
4.3.2.3. Denial-of-Service 
This is a big issue when coming to both methods of data collection. For these collection 
methods, there is no formal protocol or way of avoiding denial-of-service. This is justified on 
two grounds: first, denial-of-service is in many cases indistinguishable from the type of 
network failures with which any viable network-management application must cope as a 
matter of course; and second, a denial-of-service attack is likely to disrupt all types of 
exchanges and is a matter for an overall security facility, not one embedded in a network-
management protocol (56). Denial-of-service can be defeated by constraining an attacker’s 












attackers to a small percentage of system resources and that would slow such attacks 
sufficiently so that they can be detected.  
 We can implement a router filter that lessens the exposure to certain denial-of-service 
attacks.  




From the above investigations, Syslog seems to be bandwidth-efficient as it consumes only 
0.10Mb in a month for collecting the data from routers, while SNMP uses 0.14Mb per month 
of bandwidth. Security issues like denial-of-service apply to both SNMP and Syslog. 
Methods are available to reduce the impact of denial-of-service for both collection methods. 
In this project Syslog data collection method seems to be more efficient in bandwidth usage. 
The data gathering component was implemented using the Syslog protocol, a syslog daemon 
program was installed on each of the 615 Cisco WRT54GL router devices in more than 400 
hotspots in the Cape Town network. The program was left to run from 2009-07-03 12h00 to 
2009-09-02 04h00 collecting monitoring data at every hour’s interval, thus leading to up to 
356537 items in the experiment dataset. 
 
4.3.3. Performance Metrics 
We conducted a set of experiments based on three performance metrics which are usually 
used in performance evaluation of Wi-Fi networks. These include: 
 
4.3.3.1. Uptime and Downtime 
This metric measures the time a device has been up and running. It reveals the availability, 
stability and reliability of the communication device when used in the network.  The metric 
can help in measuring the downtime. The time the device was not available on the network. It 
is also a measure of the reliability and the stability of the network device; measuring the time 
the device can operate without needing attention. The device can experience unplanned 
power failures and when the device is down, it makes it impossible for the client to connect to 
the hotspot. The device can also go down due to scheduled maintenance plans or system 
reboots. In the SLA that the client and service provider may agree on, for example: 99.999% 
availability, reliability and stability of the Wi-Fi network’s devices. The administrator can use 
the performance metric to measure if the agreed level of service is met, and if it is not met, 













4.3.3.2. Load Average 
Measures the ‘congestion rate’ for the device based on the number of users connected to the 
device. The routers or hotspots are placed at strategic business places like coffee shops, 
airports and hotels. There may be hotspots in positions where there are a large number of 
clients accessing the hotpot. If the hotspot becomes highly congested, some clients may not 
be able to access the hotspot (which is not good for business), simply because the router 
cannot handle the load on that particular hotpot. The historic data for this variable will allow 
the network operator to determine if the router at a particular hotspot is able to handle the 
load [26]. 
 
4.3.3.3. Radio Noise and Channel 
Wi-Fi uses the 2.4 GHz spectrum band which is shared with other devices like cell phones, 
GPS, RFID tags and Bluetooth devices. Note that the proliferation of devices using the free 
2.4 GHz ISM band leads to more congested and noisy Wi-Fi devices. 
In a certain area, one can have a number of devices that use the shared frequency spectrum, 
and these devices may have overlapping channels, causing radio noise among them. This can 
be a problem in high-density areas, like airports and office buildings where there are many 
Wi-Fi access points and many users with devices that use the shared spectrum. 
This level of noise can be very risky for the internet service provider; if the level of noise is 
very high, the client will not be able to connect to the hotspot’s access point, and if they do 
connect, the quality of service will be very poor. Environmental factors can also cause a 
network device to experience high levels of noise; for example, road works outside an office 
may affect the noise level of a router of an organisation. The numerical data and graphs that 
are presented to the network administrator can help them recognise a trend in the level of 
noise for a router; they can then take appropriate actions to remedy the problem [26]. 
The section that follows will describe the experiment’s planning and mapping 
4.3.4. Experimental Design 
The experiment plan and mapping consisted of four stages and they are shown by Figure 4.4 













Figure 4.4: Experimental Plan 
1. Data analysis. In this stage, descriptive statistics from the dataset were used to reveal 
the network’s performance level in terms of time series characteristics and descriptive 
summary statistics. This allowed a summary of the observations by considering their 
central tendency and statistical dispersion.  
2. Feature extraction. At this stage, the readings/observations received were discretised 
or reduced for further processing.  
a. A Java program was written specifically for feature extraction. The Java 
program takes raw data from the database, together with the information 
revealed in the ‘Data Analysis Stage’ to perform feature extraction.  
b. This program was written also for preparing and encoding database entries 
into data entries that will be used by the algorithms for anomaly detection and 
aberrant behaviour detection.  
c. For encoding the database entries, the Java program used the test case 
parameters supplied. The method of encoding is explained in section 3.5 and 
the test cases parameter are described in section 3.6. 
3. Anomaly Detection. This stage is aimed at discovering those readings/observations 
associated to unacceptable device performance. The data produced at this stage were 
then used by machine learning algorithms AIS, BBN and ANN to perform anomaly 
detection. 
4. Aberrant Performance Detection. This stage uses the observations obtained from the 
‘Data Analysis stage’ to detect aberrant behaviour. An observation will fall into the 
aberrant behaviour category when its observed values fall outside the statistical 
confidence band, an outlier. A total deviation of the observation will depend on a 
defined Delta (δ) parameter. The data produced at this stage were fed into machine 
learning algorithms for further processing and aberrant performance detection AIS, 













4.3.5. Encoding of Performance Metrics 
Using numeric attributes to encode the three performance metrics, we considered categorical 
data for our pattern recognition. Therefore, the dataset was discretised for further processing 
and the following three categories were considered as performance levels achievable by the 
three performance metrics:  
                                                 
                                                                  
                                                                 
 
4.3.5.1. Noise 
In the dataset, the noise performance was multiplied by 100 (for calibration purposes) and 
noise values were categorised using the following encoding: 
                                      
                                                      
                                           
 
4.3.5.2. Load 
The load expressed the UNIX kernel load average multiplied by 100. The load values were 
categorised using the following encoding: 
                        
                                        
                               
 
4.3.5.3. Uptime and Downtime 
The Uptime is the device uptime considered as the current uptime (in minutes) since last 
reboot. The downtime rate per router is defined by: 
               
                                                            
                        
 
 
The Downtime was categorised using the following encoding: 












                                                  
                                        
 
4.3.5.4. Aberrant Performance Detection 
Aberrant behaviour in performance can be seen as performance that deviates from normal or 
average performance. The standard deviation and statistical confidence bands can be used to 
measure aberrant behaviour in performance.  
The empirical rule in statistics is that we classify aberrant behaviour as those observations 
that fall outside two standard deviation from the mean (approximately 95% of the standard 
confidence band); and those observations that fall outside three standard deviation from the 
mean (approximately 99.7$ of observations). The term we used in these experiments is the 
Delta (δ); and the Delta (δ) parameter will be classified as aberrant performance when it takes 
up values between 2 and 3 [70]. 
4.3.6. Test Cases 
We conducted experiments using four test case scenarios revealing Wi-Fi operating 
constraints from loose (for example, rural setting where QoS is not an issue) to the most 
stringent (for example, suburban setting where modern applications demand QoS). In the 
experiments conducted, four sets of test cases were devised. These test cases are defined by 
Table 4.1 in terms of Noise, Load, Downtime rate (overall time the device was down) and the 
confidence band δ. 














4.4. Experiment Results  
Using the parameters described in the test cases of Table 4.1, we conducted another set of 
experiments to detect anomalous and aberrant network performance and different types of 
faults. Alongside good detectors revealing good performance, Table 4.2 below show a set of 
artificial immune non-self detectors that are anomalous and aberrant to the system’s 
performance, i.e. not desired in the network. This table reflects a mapping from the encoding 
of performance levels of Table 4.1 into an antibody coding used by the AIS system.   
 
Table 4.2: Non-self-Detectors for the Experiment 
 
 
The section that follows will reveal and discuss the results obtained from the experiments 
conducted in the Wi-Fi network monitoring research. It will discuss the network’s anomaly 
performance then followed by the network’s aberrant performance. This will include data-
mining results for both anomaly and aberrant network performance. 
 
4.4.1. Anomaly Performance 
The objective of this study is to investigate whether there is a significant difference in 
average anomaly performance for the MLP, NaiveBayes and AIRS2 algorithms. To do this 
we will describe bar charts and employ hypothesis testing statistics. The study will discuss 
the results for Anomaly performance based on the following algorithm performance 
measures: Kappa Statistic, True Positive Rate, False Positive Rate, Precision, Recall, F-
measure, ROC Area, and data mined by the three algorithms. 
 
4.4.1.1. Anomaly Kappa Statistic Performance 
The Kappa Statistic is used to measure the agreement between predicted and observed 
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Figure 4.5: Anomaly Kappa Statistic Performance Bar Chart 
Figure 4.5 above is a bar chart representation of the Kappa Statistic performance of the three 
algorithms across the four test cases. The MLP and NaiveBayes had a very good average 
Kappa Statistic performance of 98.59% and 94.60%, respectively. For MLP, test case 3 had 
the lowest Kappa statistic performance of 97.96% while the highest was 98.92% in test case 
3. For NaiveBayes the lowest Kappa Statistic performance was 87.86% at test case 3 and the 
highest was 99.97% at test case 3. 
The AIRS2 algorithm had a poor average Kappa Statistic Performance of 18.10%. In test case 
1, the AIRS2’s Kappa statistic performance was the highest at 31.19%, and the lowest was 
2.07% in test case 3.  
Table 4.3: Results for Anomaly Kappa Statistic T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly Kappa Statistic: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly Kappa Statistic: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 12.58 and its two-tailed p-value is 4.29687E-27. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 












that there is a difference in the mean anomaly Kappa Statistic for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Anomaly Kappa Statistic: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly Kappa Statistic: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 91.00 and its two-tailed p-value is 4.14E-164. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a difference in the mean anomaly Kappa Statistic for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
4.4.1.2. Anomaly True Positive Rate Performance 
True positive rate represents the rate at which a classifier algorithm fails to reject a true null 
hypothesis. This measures the accuracy of an algorithm to correctly classify. 
 
Figure 4.6: Anomaly True Positive Rate Performance Bar Chart 
Figure 4.6 above is a bar chart representation of the Anomaly TP rate performance across the 
four test cases. The MLP and NaiveBayes had a very good average anomaly TP rate of 
99.45% and 97.40%, respectively. For all test cases, the MLP algorithm had a TP Rate 
performance above 99.0%. The NaiveBayes algorithms achieved a 100% TP rate in test case 
3 and the lowest being 92.90% in test case 2.  
The AIRS2 algorithm had a poor anomaly TP rate performance of 47.83% across the test 
cases. In test case 4, the AIRS2 algorithm had a 70.30% TP rate and the lowest being 17.00% 












Table 4.4: Results for Anomaly True Positive Rate T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly TP Rate: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly TP Rate: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 13.858 and its two-tailed p-value is 5.147E-31. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly True Positive Rate for the MLP and 
NaiveBayes algorithms. 
For the test: 
Anomaly TP Rate: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly TP Rate: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 32.981 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.34191E-82. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly True Positive Rate for the MLP and AIRS2 
algorithms. 
 
4.4.1.3. Anomaly False Positive Rate Performance 
The false positive rate represents the rate at which a classifier algorithm will reject a true null 













Figure 4.7: Anomaly False Positive Rate Performance Bar Chart 
The bar chart representation in Figure 4.7 reveals that across all four test cases, the MLP and 
NaiveBayes had a very good average FP rate of 0.78% and 1.98%, respectively. 
 The AIRS2 algorithm had a much higher average FP rate performance of 19.93% across all 
test cases. The AIRS2 algorithm had the higher anomaly FP rate of 33.60% in test case 4. 
Table 4.5: Results for Anomaly False Positive Rate T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly FP Rate: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly FP Rate: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -2.188 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.0298. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is significant and there is strong evidence to infer that the alternative hypothesis 
is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a difference in the 
mean anomaly False Positive Rate for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. 
For the test: 












Anomaly FP Rate: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -22.482 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.57884E-56. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly False Positive Rate for the MLP and AIRS2 
algorithms. 
 
4.4.1.4. Anomaly Precision Performance 
A classification algorithm’s Precision measures the percentage of instances classified as 
‘positive’ were indeed ‘positive’. 
 
Figure 4.8: Anomaly Precision Performance Bar Chart 
Figure 4.8 above is a bar chart epresentation of results for the four test cases. The chart 
reveals that the MLP had an average Precision of 99.45%, while the NaiveBayes had an 
average Precision rate of 97.80% across the four test cases. In all test cases, The MLP had 
anomaly precision above 99.0%. The NaiveBayes had the highest precision of 100% in test 
case 3 and the lowest being 94.0% in test case 2. 
The AIRS2 algorithm had a satisfactory precision of 73.23%. The AIRS2 algorithm had the 













Table 4.6: Results for Anomaly Precision T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly Precision: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly Precision: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 11.450 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.19605E-23. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly precision for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Anomaly Precision: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly Precision: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 25.199 and its two-tailed p-value is 7.74311E-64. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly precision for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
4.4.1.5. Anomaly Recall Performance 














Figure 4.9: Anomaly Recall Performance Bar Chart 
Figure 4.9 above is a bar chart representation of the Anomaly Recall performance for the 
three algorithms across four test cases. The MLP and NaiveBayes had an average anomaly 
recall of 99.45% and 97.40%, respectively. In test case 3, the NaiveBayes achieved a 100% 
Anomaly recall, displaying a good performance above the MLP. The AIRS2 had a poor 
average anomaly recall of 47.83%. 
Table 4.7: Results for Anomaly Recall T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly Recall: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly Recall: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 13.858 and its two-tailed p-value is 5.147E-31. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly recall for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. 
For the test: 












Anomaly Recall: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 32.981 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.34191E-82. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly recall for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
4.4.1.6. Anomaly F-measure Performance 
There is a trade-off between Precision (P) and Recall (R) measures. When one tries to 
improve the first measure, there is often deterioration in the second measure. This represents 
a Multi-Criteria-Decision-Making (MCDM) problem, and the F-measure provides a harmonic 
mean for the MCDM problem. 
 
Figure 4.10: Anomaly F-measure Performance Bar Chart 
Figure 4.10 above reveals that the MLP and NaiveBayes had an average anomaly F-measure 
of 99.45% and 97.43%, respectively, across the four test cases. The AIRS2 algorithm had an 
average anomaly F-measure of 52.33%. The AIRS2 had the lowest F-measure in test case 3 
and the highest F-measure performance in test case 4. 
Table 4.8: Results for Anomaly F-Measure T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 












Anomaly F-Measure: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly F-Measure: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 12.853 and its two-tailed p-value is 6.32577E-28. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly F-measure for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Anomaly F-Measure: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly F-Measure: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 32.163 and its two-tailed p-value is 9.08911E-81. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly F-measure for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
4.4.1.7. Anomaly ROC Area Performance 
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves represents a trade-off between true positive 
rate and false positive rate. The area under the curve measures the probability that a 
classification algorithm will rank a randomly chosen positive instance above a randomly 
chosen negative one. 
 
Figure 4.11: Anomaly ROC Area Performance Bar Chart 
The bar chart in Figure 4.11 above reveals that the MLP and NaiveBayes had a satisfactory 












respectively, across the four test cases. The AIRS2 had an average anomaly ROC Area 
performance of 63.95% across all test cases.  
Table 4.9: Results for Anomaly ROC Area T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly ROC Area: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly ROC Area: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 15.706 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.08402E-36. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly ROC Area for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Anomaly ROC Area: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly ROC Area: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 57.250 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.43E-125. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly ROC Area for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
4.4.2. Aberrant Performance 
Aberrant performance represents behaviour in a network that is noticed over a longer period 
of time, performance that deviates from normal or known performance. This kind of 
behaviour was detected in the network and we used the three algorithms to research their 
ability to detect and correctly classify this kind of network performance. To measure their 












measures: Kappa Statistic, True Positive Rate, False Positive Rate, Precision, Recall, F-
measure, ROC Area, and data mined by the three algorithms. 
 
 
4.4.2.1. Aberrant Kappa Statistic Performance 
 
Figure 4.12: Aberrant Kappa Statistic Performance Bar Chart 
Figure 4.12 above displays a bar chart representation of the Aberrant Kappa Statistic 
performance from the experiments. The MLP and NaiveBayes had a poor average aberrant 
Kappa statistic of 25.83% and 18.05%.  In test case 1 the MLP had a 2.68% Kappa statistic 
performance; this kept increasing until 39.57% in test case 4. The NaiveBayes had a Kappa 
statistic performance between 15% and 20% across all test cases. 
The AIRS2 had an even worse average aberrant Kappa statistic of 0.16% across all test cases. 
Table 4.10: Results for Aberrant Kappa Statistic T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant Kappa Statistic: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 












The value of the t-Statistic is -26.2185 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.78992E-66. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant Kappa statistic for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Aberrant Kappa Statistic: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant Kappa Statistic: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 4.191 and its two-tailed p-value is 4.17955E-5. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant Kappa statistic for the MLP and AIRS2 
algorithms. 
 
4.4.2.2. Aberrant True Positive Rate Performance 
 
Figure 4.13: Aberrant True Positive Rate Performance Bar Chart 
The bar chart in Figure 4.13 depicts that MLP and NaiveBayes had a fair aberrant TP rate 
performance. The average TP rate performance for MLP and NaiveBayes was at 80.18% and 
76.20%, respectively, across all test cases. The MLP had its highest performance of 81.80% 
in test case 4, and its lowest performance of 77.80% in test case 1. The NaiveBayes had a TP 
rate performance between 75.30% and 77.00%. The AIRS2 had a poor average aberrant TP 












Table 4.11: Results for Aberrant True Positive Rate T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant True Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant True Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 15.300 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.89454E-35. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant true positive rate for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Aberrant True Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant True Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 447.618 and its two-tailed p-value is 8.2142E-301. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 



















4.4.2.3. Aberrant False Positive Rate Performance 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Aberrant False Positive Rate Performance Bar Chart 
The MLP and NaiveBayes had a very high and poor average aberrant FP rate of 58.23% and 
60.08%, respectively. The AIRS had a very good average aberrant FP rate of 2.00% across all 
test cases. This is shown by the bar chart graph of Figure 4.14.  
Table 4.12: Results for Aberrant False Positive Rate T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant False Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant False Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 44.245 and its two-tailed p-value is 6.272E-105. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant false positive rate for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 












Aberrant False Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant False Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 177.256 and its two-tailed p-value is 5.5555E-221. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant false positive rate for the MLP and AIRS2 
algorithms. 
 
4.4.2.4. Aberrant Precision Performance 
 
Figure 4.15: Aberrant Precision Performance Bar Chart 
The three algorithms had a fair aberrant precision performance. The MLP and NaiveBayes 
had an average aberrant precision performance of 68.15% and 66.38%, respectively. The 
AIRS2 had an average aberrant precision performance of 58.30%. This is shown by the bar 
chart graph of figure 4.15. For all the three algorithms, their performance was almost similar 
and fluctuated between 59% and 71%. The MLP performance kept increasing from 61.90% 
in test case 1 to the highest 71.20% in test case 3. A similar increasing performance was 
displayed by the NaiveBayes by improving from a 65.80% in test case 1 to 66.80% in test 
case 4. The opposite performance was then displayed by the NaiveBayes with a 59.60% 












Table 4.13: Results for Aberrant Precision T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant Precision: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant Precision: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -34.626 and its two-tailed p-value is 3.49428E-86. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant precision for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Aberrant Precision: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant Precision: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 24.614 and its two-tailed p-value is 2.68015E-62. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 













4.4.2.5. Aberrant Recall Performance 
 
Figure 4.16: Aberrant Recall Performance Bar Chart 
The bar chart in figure 4.16 reveals that the MLP had an average aberrant Recall performance 
of 80.18%, while the NaiveBayes had an average aberrant performance of 76.20% across all 
test cases. The AIRS2 algorithm had a poor average aberrant recall of 2.10% across all test 
cases. The MLP had a 77.80% Recall performance in test case 1; this kept improving until an 
81.80% performance in test case 4. The NaiveBayes had a similar trend; it started with a 
75.30% performance in test case 1, and improved to 76.90% in test case 4.  
Table 4.14: Results for Aberrant Recall T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant Recall: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant Recall: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 15.300 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.89454E-35. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant recall for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. 












Aberrant Recall: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant Recall: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 447.618 and its two-tailed p-value is 8.2142E-301. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant recall for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
4.4.2.6. Aberrant F-measure Performance 
 
Figure 4.17: Aberrant F-measure Performance 
Figure 4.17 above displays a bar chart graph of results, and this indicates that, across all test 
cases, the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms had an average aberrant f-measure performance 
of 72.65% and 70.65%, respectively. On the other hand, the AIRS2 algorithms had poor 
average aberrant F-measure performance of 1.68%. The MLP had an F-measure performance 
of 68.40% in test case 1, this kept improving until a 75.40% in test case 4. A similar trend in 
performance can be noticed with the NaiveBayes algorithm; in test case 1, the F-measure 
performance was 69.80% and this kept slightly improving until a 71.20% performance in test 
case 4. 













For the test: 
Aberrant F-measure: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant F-measure: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -20.584 and its two-tailed p-value is 3.46143E-51. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant F-measure for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Aberrant F-measure: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant F-measure: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 258.388 and its two-tailed p-value is 2.077E-253. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant F-measure for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
4.4.2.7. Aberrant ROC Area Performance 
 
Figure 4.18: Aberrant ROC Area Performance 
Across all test cases, the MLP and NaiveBayes had an average aberrant ROC area of 72.13% 
and 65.05%, respectively. The AIRS2 had an average aberrant ROC Area of 50.05%. This is 












Table 4.16: Results for Aberrant ROC Area T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant ROC Area: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant ROC Area: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -23.106 and its two-tailed p-value is 3.04494E-58. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant ROC Area for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Aberrant ROC Area: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant ROC Area: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 29.963 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.09284E-75. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant ROC Area for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
4.4.3. Data Mining Using a Confusion Matrix 
This section of the results chapter will reveal the data mined using the algorithms, for both 
anomaly and aberrant performance detection. The section will discuss results from the 













4.4.3.1. Anomaly Performance Detection 
Anomaly Performance is network performance that is above a given threshold, one that is 
unacceptable in the network. This section will discuss results obtained from anomaly 
detection using the three algorithms. 
4.4.3.1.1. Multilayer Perceptron Anomaly Detection 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Multilayer Perceptron Anomaly Detection Bar Chart 
The MLP identified 6 types of detectors. Among those detectors that were identified, the 
‘111’ and ‘211’ detectors represent good and desired network performance. The ‘111’ 
represents good noise, load and downtime performance, while ‘211’ represents moderate 
noise levels with low load and low downtime performance. These detectors contributed 
76.78% to 82.28% of the network’s anomaly performance. 
From Test cases 1 to 4, the detection rate of ‘111’ kept decreasing whilst that of ‘211’ 
increased. This is an indication that as the network thresholds are made more stringent, a 
large portion of ‘111’ detectors became ‘211’. This indicates a good network performance. 
Not only did the ‘111’ type performance change to ‘211’ performance when thresholds were 
made more stringent. Changing parameter settings from test case 1 to test case 4 brought 
about an increase in ‘311’ type performance. The ‘311’ type performance represents bad 
noise performance, with low load levels and low downtime levels. This can be correlated 
with the change in detector rate from ‘111’ to ‘211’ and ‘311’. They ‘311’ detector type 
contributed 0.28% to 9.72% of the network’s performance throughout test cases 1 to 4. 
Another detector identified in the network was that of type ‘113’, the detector represents 
those devices in the network experiencing high levels of downtime, with low noise and low 
load. As the performance thresholds are made more stringent from test case 1 to 4, its 
detection rate decrease from 6.86% to 0.39%.  
From test case 1 to 4, there was a decrease of ‘113’ detectors, this can be correlated with an 












network that had experienced moderate levels of noise with low load level, but with high 
levels of downtime. The ‘313’ detectors represents those devices in the network that 
experienced high levels of noise and downtime, with very low levels of load performance. 
The ‘213’ increased from 0.99% in test case1, to 7.46% in test case 4. A similar increasing 
detection rate was shown by the ‘313’ detector when it increased from 0.04% in test case 1 to 
0.54% in test case 4. 
 
4.4.3.1.2. NaiveBayes Anomaly Detection 
 
Figure 4.20: NaiveBayes Anomaly Detection Bar Chart 
The NaiveBayes algorithm was able to identify 11 types of detectors. Although the 
NaiveBayes had identified 11 detectors in comparison with the 6 detectors identified by the 
MLP, the two algorithms had a similar performance.  
From test case 1 to test case 4, the detection rate of the ‘111’ detector decreased from a high 
77.53% to a low 4.32%. On the other hand, as the detection rate of the ‘111’ detector 
decreased; there was an increase in detection rate for the ‘211’ and ‘311’ type detectors.  
The detection rate of ‘211’ increased from a low 14.53% in test case 1 to a high 82.10% in 
test case 4. A similar increase was seen when the ‘311’ detection rate increased from 0.02% 
in test case 1 to 9.84% in test case 4. 
The detection rate of the ‘113’ detector in test case 1 was 7.08%, and this decreased to 4.32% 
in test case 3, and 0% detection rate in test case 4. The decrease of ‘113’ detection rate can be 
correlated with the increase in ‘213’ and ‘313’ detector types.  
The detection rate of ‘213’ increased from 0.82% in test case 1, to 7.51% in test case 4. A 
similar performance was experienced with the ‘313’ type detector. Its detection rate increased 
from 0.03% in test case 1 to 0.55% in test case 4. 
The NaiveBayes was able to identify 5 more detectors, the ‘121’, 123’, 131’, 221’, and the 
231’. This group of detectors each contributed to less than 0.01% performance detection rate 













4.4.3.1.3. AIRS2 Anomaly Detection 
 
Figure 4.21: AIRS2 Anomaly Detection Bar Chart 
The AIRS2 algorithm was able to identify 6 detectors in the network and those that 
dominated the network were the ‘111’ and the ‘211’ type detectors. These detectors represent 
good performance of the network. The detection rate for the ‘111’ type detector was 84.99% 
in test case 1, and this was reduced to 13.64% in test case 3 and 0% in test case 4. This can be 
related to an increased detection rate of ‘211’ type detectors, in test case 1 its detection rate 
was 4.61% and this increased to 95.77% in test case 4. 
The bar chart in figure 4.21 indicates that in test case 1, the ‘113’ detection rate was 10.00%, 
and this was reduced to 2.14% in test case 3 and to 0% in test case 4. This decrease can be 
related with the increased detection ra e of ‘213’. In test case 1, the detection rate of ‘213’ 
was 0.39%, and this increased to 12.09% in test case 3 and 4.23% in test case 4. 
The detectors that had low detection rate were that of type ‘131’ and ‘221’. They both had a 
detection rate less than 0.01% for all test cases 1 to 4. ‘131’ represents devices that had 
experienced high levels of load, with low levels of both noise and downtime. The ‘221’ 
detector represent devices with moderate noise and load performance, with low downtime 
performance. 
 
4.4.3.2. Aberrant Performance Detection 
Aberrant performance represents those devices in the network that has experienced high and 
unstable changes in noise, load or downtime performance. Detecting and remedying this kind 
of performance can lead to pre-emptive measures in preventing network failure in the future. 














4.4.3.2.1. Multilayer Perceptron Aberrant Detection 
 
Figure 4.22: MLP Aberrant Detection Bar Chart 
The MLP was able to identify 8 detectors. The most dominant was detector type ‘313’, and it 
represents those devices in the network that have experienced prolonged, unstable and high 
changes in noise and downtime performance with low changes in noise levels. The ‘313’ had 
a very high detection rate, 99.70% in test case 1, and this detection rate kept dropping until 
92.95% in test case 4. 
The decrease in the detection rate of the ‘313’ detector can be linked to an increase in 
detection rate of the ‘323’ and ‘333’ type detectors. 
The ‘323’ represents those devices in the network that have experienced prolonged, unstable 
and high changes in noise and downtime performance with moderate changes in noise levels. 
The detection rate of ‘323’ increased from 0% in test case 1, to 2.31% in test case 4. 
The ‘333’ represents those devices in the network that have experienced prolonged, unstable 
and high changes in noise, load and downtime performance. This is a state of the device that 
is not desirable by a network administrator. Its detection rate increased from 0.30% in test 
case 1, to 4.73% in test case 4. 
The detection rate for ‘113’, ‘133’, ‘311’ and ‘321’ was very low at 0.05%. 
 
4.4.3.2.2. NaiveBayes Aberrant Detection 
The NaiveBayes was able to identify 8 detectors. These are the same detectors as those 
identified in the MLP Aberrant Detection experiment. 
The most pre-eminent detector was the type ‘313’, its detection rate in test case 1 was 97.62% 
and this kept decreasing to 95.66% in test case 4. This decrease in detection rate can be 














Figure 4.23: NaiveBayes Aberrant Detection Bar Chart 
For the NaiveBayes experiment, the detection rate of the ‘323’ detector was very different 
from that of MLP. Its detection rate decreased in NaiveBayes experiment, as opposed to an 
increased detection rate in the MLP experiment. In test case 1, the detection rate was at 
0.62%, and this decreased to a 0.02% detection rate in test case 4.  
In test case 1, the detection rate of ‘333’ was 0.54% and this kept increasing until 3.16% in 
test case 4. This is a similar performance compared to the MLP. 
 
4.4.3.2.3. AIRS2 Aberrant Detection 
 
Figure 4.24: AIRS2 Aberrant Detection Bar Chart 
The AIRS2 algorithm was able to identify 16 detectors. The most pre-eminent were the ‘113’, 
‘213’, ‘311’ and ‘313’ type detectors. 
The ‘113’ detector represents those network devices experiencing unstable and high changes 
in downtime performance, with moderate changes in both noise and load. Its detection rate in 












The ‘213’ type detector represents those network devices that had experienced unstable and 
high changes in downtime level, with moderate noise and low load performance. In test case 
1, its detection rate was 2.06% and in test case 2 it got to its highest of 14.05%. The detection 
rate dropped to 3.49% in test case 4. 
The ‘311’ represents those devices in the network that experienced unstable and high changes 
in noise performance, with low changes in both load and downtime performance. Its 
detection rate in test case 1 was 2.83%, this peaked to 7.29% in test case 3 and it dropped to a 
1.24% detection rate in test case 4. 
The ‘313’ represents those devices in the network that had experienced unstable and high 
changes in noise and downtime performance, but with a low changes in load performance. Its 
detection rate reached the highest peak in test case 1, but this was reduced to a 12.77% in test 
case 4. 
With the AIRS2 the detector types ‘111’, ‘121’, ‘123’, ‘131’, ‘133’, ‘211’, ‘221’, ‘223’, 




4.5.1. Anomaly Network Performance Detection 
The statistical hypothesis test experiments conducted for anomaly performance detection 
reveal that in all eight algorithm performance measures there is a significant mean difference 
among the three algorithms.  
The bar chart representations in figure 4.5 to 4.11 were carefully examined, and for all 
performance measures, the MLP has had an overall good performance and came out with the 
highest (above90%) algorithm performance measures. The NaiveBayes also had a good 
performance that was slightly lower than that of the MLP; it came second after the MLP. On 
the other hand, the AIRS2 had a poor performance relative to the MLP and NaiveBayes.  
The data-mining capabilities of the MLP and NaiveBayes were statistically different, but the 
NaiveBayes identified the same detectors as the MLP, and even more detectors that the MLP 
was unable to identify. The detection rate of those common detectors was slightly similar.  
The AIRS2 identified a few common detectors to both the MLP and NaiveBayes, with 
differing average detection rates to those of the MLP and NaiveBayes. The accuracy of the 
AIRS2 was poor, at 60% average; therefore one can question the accuracy of the data mining 
evaluations revealed in section 4.4.3 of the results section. 
Overall, the MLP showed excellent accuracy in network anomaly performance detection. The 














4.5.2. Aberrant Network Performance Detection 
As shown in section 4.2, the statistical hypothesis test experiments conducted for network 
aberrant performance detection indicate that there is a statistical difference in mean 
performance measures for the MLP, NaiveBayes and AIRS2 in all 8 performance measures. 
Therefore the performances for all three algorithms are not statistically similar. 
The bar charts in Figure 4.12 to Figure 4.18 in section 4.2 of the chapter indicate that the 
performance of the three algorithms had a worsened, relative to anomaly performance 
detection. The MLP and NaiveBayes performance was reduced from being an excellent 90% 
accuracy to a good to mediocre 70-80% accuracy. 
The data-mining capabilities of the MLP and NaiveBayes may have not been statistically the 
same as shown by the performance measures in section 4.2 of the chapter, but were slightly 
similar as shown by the bar charts in Figure 4.22 and Figure 4.24.  
The data-mining capabilities of the AIRS2 algorithms are revealed by the bar chart in figure 
4.24, and are very different from those shown by the MLP and NaiveBayes in bar charts for 
Figure 4.22 and Figure 4.23. This can be reflective of the AIRS2’s poor performance 
measures shown in section 4.2. 
Overall, the MLP and NaiveBayes had a good aberrant performance measures, but not as 














5. REDBUTTON NETWORK 
INTRUSION DETECTION CASE STUDY 
5.1. Introduction 
Case study 1 of the dissertation has revealed that there is an overwhelming growth in the use 
of Wi-Fi networks in airports, hotels and enterprises. It has also indicated the need for 
intelligent computational techniques to handle the massive monitoring data that is needed for 
the network monitoring. However, there is a greater challenge of avoiding network attacks. 
There have been prevention techniques such as firewalls, access control or encryption, but 
these have failed to fully protect networks from attacks [92]. Authors in [12] indicate that 
there are two main types of attacks to Wi-Fi networks, unintentional and intentional. 
Unintentional attacks come from devices that use the same ISM freque cy band using the 
2.4GHz spectrum. These include devices like cell phones, GPS, RFID tags and Bluetooth 
devices. Other devices that are not used for communication such as microwave ovens 
transmit RF in this spectrum [12]. This type of transmission can disrupt Wi-Fi 
communication through interference and thus prevent the user from connecting to the Wi-Fi 
spot. With Intentional attacks a malicious user disrupts Wi-Fi communications through the 
use of a normal PC and software. This can cause denial-of-service and prevent access to the 
network [12]. 
In this case study we explore the intentional attacks where a hacker or attacker is sitting at a 
computer and sending erroneous data to a monitoring system.  In case study 1, we looked at 
the performance of three machine learning algorithms, AIS, NaiveBayes and MLP on 
detecting anomalous and aberrant performance in a network. Again, we would like to explore 
the impact of an intentional attacker on a network, and the ability of the three machine 
learning algorithms to be able to detect anomaly and aberrant performance in the network. 
 
5.2. Background and Related Work 
According to [92], “an intrusion detection system dynamically monitors the events taking 
place in a system, and decides whether these events are systematic of an attack or constitute a 
legitimate use of the system”. Intrusion detection systems use computational intelligence to 
classify what belongs as normal behaviour, and what is abnormal behaviour.  
There has been much previous work in the field of AIS techniques applied to intrusion 
detection, and there is on-going research in this field. This work includes that of [89], where 
they examined the use of AIS to detect computer network intrusion. They found out that the 
AIS is able to discriminate from what belongs as normal behaviour and what does not; and 












deployed on a larger peer-to-peer network. They found out that the AIS framework had a 
good detection rate and low false positive rate.  
Similar work was produced using artificial neural networks, in [31], where they used an 
artificial neural network to learn the behaviour of a program in order to detect intrusive 
behaviour by a computer virus. In [38], neural networks were used to detect anomaly 
intrusion in TCP and IP header information for the data from the Defence Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the neural network managed to achieve a best 
overall classification of 99.42%. 
In [49], they used a Bayesian classification method to correctly classify network intrusions 
using the MIT Lincoln Labs 1999 datasets. Using Bayesian classification resulted in lower 
false positive rate performance when compared to traditional intrusion detection systems. The 
work done in [84, 85] was an extension of an open source intrusion detection system with 
Bayesian networks capabilities. ‘Snort’ is an open source network-based intrusion detection 
system that is able to perform protocol analysis and real-time traffic analysis and packet 
logging on internet IP networks.  In this work it was combined with the use of open source 
C++ Bayesian networks systems (SMILE and GeNIe). The aim was to produce a lower false 
positive rate for the intrusion detection system.  
Based on the success of the AIS, Bayesian Network and Artificial Neural Networks machine 
learning algorithm, and following the model used in the previous case study, we would like to 
implement the algorithms for monitoring a large-scale W-Fi hotspots network where the 
dataset used previously was altered to mimic intrusion. The performance of the three 
algorithms (AIRS2, NaiveBayes and MLP) is evaluated and statistically compared. In this 
evaluation and comparison we would like to answer the following research questions: 
 Which method performs better? 
 How do they perform under different test cases and network thresholds? 
 How do the methods perform for anomaly detection, and aberrant behaviour 
detection? 
 What kind of information can be mined using these machine learning algorithms? 
 
5.3. Research Methods 
In this case study, the RedButton network was used in order to gauge the impact of 
intentional intrusion on a Wi-Fi network, and the ability of the three machine learning 
algorithms to detect anomaly and aberrant behaviour after an intrusion in the network. In this 
work, the same data collection method, network performance metrics, detector encoding 
schemes where used. The performances of the three machine learning algorithms were tested 
against four test cases that were seen in Table 4.1 of case study 1.  
The present case study uses an approach similar the RedButton case but following the model 












detection usually generate their own datasets by self-producing intrusion data and merging it 
with training datasets. Building upon this approach, when self-producing the data we 
mimicked a scenario where a malicious attacker would like to send extreme erroneous 
performance data to the syslog daemon tool, in this case, simulating a Denial-of-Service 
(DoS) attack to the tool. The self-produced data was then merged with the existing 
monitoring data, in such a way that two-thirds of the data were from the live network, while a 
third was from a self-produced malicious attacker, with extremely anomalous data.  
In generating the anomalous data, an extreme level of anomaly was considered. The 
following Java pseudo code was used: 
                                  
                              
                          
Using this pseudo code, the generated values of noise will fall between -30.00dB and -
80.00db. This range of noise values are considered to be undesirable in a Wi-Fi network [26]. 
The load values will range between load levels of 80% to 180% when using the pseudo code 
above. Uptime will have a value below 60 minutes, indicating that the gateway device has 
recovered from a restart state.  
 
5.4. Experiment Results  
The results that follow in this section are from a study conducted to realise the effects of 
intrusion detection on a Wi-Fi monitoring network, and the ability of the MLP, NaiveBayes 
and AIRS2 algorithms in detecting anomaly and aberrant performance for an intruded 
network. 
 
5.4.1. Anomaly Performance 
In this study we investigate whether there is a significant difference in performance for the 
MLP, NaiveBayes and AIRS2 algorithms when detecting anomaly in an intruded network. 
An experiment was conducted and the following results are revealed using bar charts 
description, and hypothesis testing statistics. The study discusses the results based on the 
following performance measures: Kappa Statistic, True Positive Rate, False Positive Rate, 















5.4.1.1. Anomaly Kappa Statistic Performance 
 
Figure 5.1: Anomaly Kappa Statistic Performance Bar Chart 
Across all test cases, the MLP and NaiveBayes had an average anomaly Kappa statistic 
performance of 98.68% and 96.23%, respectively, while the AIRS2 had an average anomaly 
Kappa statistic of 83.44%. This is shown by the bar chart in Figure 5.1. The MLP Kappa 
statistic performance has been slightly above 98.00% across all test cases. The NaiveBayes 
started with a 95.88% in test case 1, this kept improving until 97.93% in test case 4. The 
AIRS2 had a good Kappa Statistic performance; the lowest performance was 79.40% in test 
case 3 and the highest was 86.92% in test case 1. 
Table 5.1: Results for Anomaly Kappa Statistic T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly Kappa Statistic: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly Kappa Statistic: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -0.888 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.375. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is not statistically significant and there is little to no evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that the difference in the mean anomaly Kappa Statistic for the MLP and NaiveBayes 












For the test: 
Anomaly Kappa Statistic: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly Kappa Statistic: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 31.371 and its two-tailed p-value is 5.732E-179. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly Kappa Statistic for the MLP and AIRS2 
algorithms. 
 
5.4.1.2. Anomaly True Positive Rate Performance 
 
Figure 5.2: Anomaly True Positive Rate Performance Bar Chart 
The MLP and the NaiveBayes had an anomaly true positive rate of 99.43% and 98.40%, 
respectively, while the AIRS2 had an average anomaly true positive rate of 93.25% across all 
test cases. The TP rate kept declining from test cases 1 to 3 and a sudden peak in test case 4. 
This is revealed by Figure 5.2 above. The anomaly TP rate performance for the MLP and 
NaiveBayes was very good, above 98% for all test cases. The AIRS2 also had a good 
performance, with the lowest being 91.00% in test case 3 and the highest being 95.70% in 












Table 5.2: Results for Anomaly True Positive Rate T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly TP Rate: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly TP Rate: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -0.450 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.653. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is not statistically significant and there is little or no evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that the difference in the mean anomaly True Positive Rate between the MLP and 
NaiveBayes algorithms equals zero, the hypothesised mean difference. 
For the test: 
Anomaly TP Rate: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly TP Rate: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 31.803 and its two-tailed p-value is 5.9359E-80. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 














5.4.1.3. Anomaly False Positive Performance 
 
Figure 5.3: Anomaly False Positive Rate Performance Bar Chart 
Figure 5.3 above reveals that across all test cases, the MLP and NaiveBayes had very low 
anomaly false positive rate of 0.28% and 0.20%, while the average anomaly false positive 
rate of the AIRS2 algorithm was 12.23%. The anomaly FP rate performance for the AIRS2 
was always above 10.0%, for all test cases. 
Table 5.3: Results for Anomaly False Positive Rate T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly FP Rate: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly FP Rate: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 8.478 and its two-tailed p-value is 5.11764E-15. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly False Positive Rate for the MLP and 
NaiveBayes algorithms. 
For the test: 












Anomaly FP Rate: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -25.646 and its two-tailed p-value is 5.334E-65. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly False Positive Rate for the MLP and AIRS2 
algorithms. 
 
5.4.1.4. Anomaly Precision Performance 
 
Figure 5.4: Anomaly Precision Performance Bar Chart 
The MLP and NaiveBayes had an average anomaly precision performance of 99.40% and 
98.55%, respectively, while the AIRS2 had an average anomaly performance of 92.50% 
across all test cases. Figure 5.4 reveals that the algorithms’ precision values declined in test 
cases 1, 2 and 3, while there was an increase in test case 3. The anomaly Precision for both 
MLP and NaiveBayes was above 98.0% for all test cases. The AIRS2 had its low 
performance at 88.90% in test case 4 and the highest performance in test case 95.40%.  
Table 5.4: Results for Anomaly Precision T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 












Anomaly Precision: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -11.184 and the two-tailed p-value is 7.56107E-23. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly precision for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Anomaly Precision: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly Precision: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 32.459 and the two-tailed p-value is 1.96364E-81. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is difference in the mean anomaly precision for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
5.4.1.5. Anomaly Recall Performance 
 
Figure 5.5: Anomaly Recall Performance Bar Chart 
Across all test cases, the average anomaly precision performance for the MLP and 
NaiveBayes was 99.43% and 98.40%, respectively, while the AIRS2 had an average anomaly 
precision of 93.25%. This is revealed by the Figure 5.5 above. The MLP and NaiveBayes had 
a very good performance above 95% across all test cases. The AIRS2 had 91.00% 












Table 5.5: Results for Anomaly Recall T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly Recall: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly Recall: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -0.450 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.653. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is not statistically significant and there is little or no evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that the difference in the mean anomaly recall for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms 
equals zero, the hypothesised mean. 
For the test: 
Anomaly Recall: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly Recall: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 31.803 and its two-tailed p-value is 5.9395E-80. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 













5.4.1.6. Anomaly F-measure Performance 
 
Figure 5.6: Anomaly F-measure Performance Bar Chart 
For anomaly F-measure performance, The MLP and NaiveBayes had an average performance 
of 99.35% and 98.38%, respectively, while the AIRS2 had an average anomaly f-measure of 
92.00% across all test cases. This is revealed by the bar chart in Figure 5.6. The overall 
anomaly F-measure performance for all algorithms was very good; the MLP and the 
NaiveBayes had performance above 98 % for all test cases. The AIRS2 had its high f-
measure performance of 95.20% in test case 1; this kept declining until it got to an f-measure 
performance of 91.20% in test case 4. 
Table 5.6: Results for Anomaly F-Measure T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Anomaly F-Measure: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly F-Measure: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -5.462 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.390434E-07. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 













For the test: 
Anomaly F-Measure: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly F-Measure: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 34.359 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.30905E-85. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly F-measure for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
5.4.1.7. Anomaly ROC Area Performance 
 
Figure 5.7: Anomaly ROC Area Performance Bar Chart 
The bar chart in Figure 5.7 reveals that across all test cases the average anomaly ROC Area 
performance for the MLP and NaiveBayes was 99.98% and 100.00%, respectively, while that 
of the AIRS2 was slightly lower at 90.53%. The NaiveBayes had a very good ROC Area 
performance achieving 100% for all test cases; the MLP had a similar performance only for 
test case 3 it achieved a 99.90% ROC area performance. The AIRS2 had its lowest ROC area 
performance of 89.30% in test case 2 and it highest performance of 91.80% in test case 1. 
Overall the algorithms had a good ROC area performance. 













For the test: 
Anomaly ROC Area: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Anomaly ROC Area: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 9.768 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.16518E-18. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly ROC Area for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Anomaly ROC Area: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Anomaly ROC Area: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 33.320 and its two-tailed p-value is 2.396E-83. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean anomaly ROC Area for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
5.4.2. Aberrant Performance 
Another experiment conducted in this study was to investigate whether there is a significant 
difference in the ability of the MLP, NaiveBayes and AIRS2 algorithms to detect aberrant 
behaviour in an intruded network. To do this, we present the experiment results using bar 
charts descriptions, and hypothesis testing statistics. The study discusses the results based on 
the following performance measures: Kappa Statistic, True Positive Rate, False Positive Rate, 















5.4.2.1. Aberrant Kappa Statistic Performance 
 
Figure 5.8: Aberrant Kappa Statistic Performance Bar Chart 
Across all test cases, the average aberrant Kappa statistic for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms was low at 30.85% and 15.03%, respectively, while that of the AIRS2 algorithm 
was even lower at 2.25%. This is show by the bar chart in figure 5.8. Kappa statistic 
performance for the MLP started at 25.29% in test case 1, and this kept improving to a 
38.51% in test case 4. A similar trend in performance was displayed by the NaiveBayes, in 
test case 1 its Kappa Statistic performance was 12.44% and this kept improving until a 
16.26% in test case 4. The overall Kappa Statistic performance for the three algorithms was 
poor. 
Table 5.8: Results for Aberrant Kappa Statistic T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant Kappa Statistic: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant Kappa Statistic: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -23.654 and its two-tailed p-value is 9.91971E-60. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 












that there is a difference in the mean aberrant Kappa statistic for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Aberrant Kappa Statistic: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant Kappa Statistic: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -0.334 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.739. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is not statistically significant and there is little or no evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that the difference in the mean aberrant Kappa statistic for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms is 
equal to zero, the hypothesised mean. 
 
5.4.2.2. Aberrant True Positive Rate Performance 
 
Figure 5.9: Aberrant TP Rate Performance Bar Chart 
The MLP and the NaiveBayes had an average aberrant TP Rate performance of 80.80% and 
77.73%, respectively, while the NaiveBayes had an average true positive rate performance of 
19.73% across all test cases. The aberrant TP rate for the MLP started with a 75.50% 
performance in test case 1, and this kept improving until an 82.00% performance in test case 
4. The performance of the NaiveBayes had a similar trend in performance, it was 75.50% in 
test case 1 and it kept improving to 79.10% performance in test case 4. The AIRS2 had a 
reverse trend in performance, from test case 1 to 4, the performance kept declining and it was 












Table 5.9: Results for Aberrant True Positive Rate T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant True Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant True Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 3.802 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.0001. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a difference in the mean aberrant true positive rate for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Aberrant True Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant True Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 573.172 and its two-tailed p-value is 0. At 5% confidence level, 
the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the alternative 
hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a 













5.4.2.3. Aberrant False Positive Rate Performance 
 
Figure 5.10: Aberrant False Positive Rate Performance Bar Chart 
The bar chart in figure 5.10 reveals that the MLP and NaiveBayes had a high average 
aberrant false positive rate performance of 54.73% and 66.18%, respectively. The aberrant FP 
rate performance for both MLP and NaiveBayes was high compared to that of the AIRS2. 
AIRS2’s aberrant FP rate performance was low at an average of 15.60% across all test cases. 
Table 5.10: Results for Aberrant False Positive Rate T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant False Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant False Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 30.228 and its two-tailed p-value is 2.58274E-76. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant false positive rate for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 












Aberrant False Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 172.735 and its two-tailed p-value is 9.1884E-219. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant false positive rate for the MLP and AIRS2 
algorithms.  
 
5.4.2.4. Aberrant Precision Performance 
 
Figure 5.11: Aberrant Precision Bar Chart 
Figure 5.11 above reveals that across all test cases, the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms had 
an average aberrant precision performance of 69.85% and 66.38%, respectively, while that of 
the AIRS2 algorithms was 64.75%. The MLP has a better aberrant precision performance of 
73.00% in test case 4. For all algorithms had average aberrant precision performance ranging 
between 65%-70%. 
Table 5.11: Results for Aberrant Precision T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 












Aberrant Precision: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -36.276 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.16913E-89. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant precision for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Aberrant Precision: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant Precision: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -35.993 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.16913E-89. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant precision for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
5.4.2.5. Aberrant Recall Performance 
 
Figure 5.12: Aberrant Recall Performance Bar Chart 
The MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms had an average aberrant recall performance of 80.80% 
and 77.73%, respectively, while that of the NaiveBayes was low at 19.73% across all test 












Table 5.12: Results for Aberrant Recall T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant Recall: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant Recall: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 3.802 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.0001. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a difference in the mean aberrant recall for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. 
For the test: 
Aberrant Recall: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant Recall: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 573.172 and its two-tailed p-value is 0. At 5% confidence level, 
the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the alternative 
hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a 













5.4.2.6. Aberrant F-measure Performance 
 
Figure 5.13: Aberrant F-measure Performance Bar Chart 
The bar chart in Figure 5.13 above reveals that the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms had an 
average aberrant f-measure of 73.90% and 70.93%, respectively, while that of the AIRS2 
algorithm was lower at 26.65%. 
Table 5.13: Results for Aberrant F-measure T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Aberrant F-measure: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Aberrant F-measure: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -20.642 and its two-tailed p-value is 2.36087E-51. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant F-measure for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 












Aberrant F-measure: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 319.760 and its two-tailed p-value is 8.7925E-272. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant F-measure for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
5.4.2.7. Aberrant ROC Area Performance 
 
Figure 5.14: Aberrant ROC Area Performance Bar Chart 
Across all test cases, the MLP and NaiveBayes had and average aberrant ROC area 
performance of 71.75% and 61.83%, respectively, while the AIRS2 algorithm had an average 
aberrant ROC area performance of 52.08%. This is shown by the bar chart in Figure 5.14. 
The MLP had a 69.00% ROC area performance in test case 1 and this kept improving to a 
75.10% in test case 4. A similar trend was seen with NaiveBayes where is had a 60.30% 
performance in test case 1 and it kept improving to a slightly higher 62.90% performance in 
test case 4.  
Table 5.14: Results for Aberrant ROC Area T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 












Aberrant ROC Area: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -29.354 and its two-tailed p-value is 3.07008E-74. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant ROC Area for the MLP and NaiveBayes 
algorithms. 
For the test: 
Aberrant ROC Area: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Aberrant ROC Area: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 13.694 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.64728E-30. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is highly significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer 
that the alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is a difference in the mean aberrant ROC Area for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
5.4.3. Data Mining Using a Confusion Matrix 
This section of the results chapter reveals data mining capabilities for the three algorithms. 
Using bar charts, we will discuss anomaly and aberrant behaviour detection in an intruded 
network. 
5.4.3.1. Anomaly Performance Detection with Intrusion 
This section discusses anomaly performance detection of the three algorithms in an intruded 
large Wi-Fi network. 













Figure 5.15: Multilayer Perceptron Anomaly Network Performance Detection Bar Chart 
The MLP was able to identify 6 detectors in the intrusion network experiment. Among those 
identified detectors, the ‘333’ had the highest detection rate. The ‘333’ represent those 
devices that had experienced high and bad performance in noise, load, and downtime levels. 
The ‘333’ had a detection rate between 79.98% in test case 1, and this kept decreasing to 
68.78% in test case 4. This makes an average detection rate of 74.10% for the ‘333’ detector. 
The ‘113’ represents those devices in the intruded network that had experienced high levels 
of downtime with low levels of noise and load performance. The detection rate for the ‘113’ 
was 11.75% in test case 1 but this kept decreasing to 0.04% in test case 3, and 0% in test case 
4. This makes an average detection rate of 6.32% across all test cases. 
The ‘213’ detector represents those devices that had experienced high levels of downtime 
with low load and moderate noise performance. The ‘213’ had a detection rate of 1.67% in 
test case 1, and this kept increasing until a 10.92% in test case 4. This makes an average 
detection rate of 7.26% across all test cases. 
The ‘311’ represents those devices in the intruded network that had experienced high levels 
of noise, with low load and downtime performance. The ‘311’ had a detection rate of 0.48% 
in test case 1, and this kept increasing to a 14.47% in test case 4,  thus making an average 
detection rate of 7.96% across all intrusion detection test cases. 
The ‘313’ had the lowest average detection rate among those identified. It represents those 
devices in the network that had experienced high levels of noise and downtime, with low load 
performance. The ‘313’ had a detection rate of 0% in test case 1, and this kept slightly 
increasing until a 0.66% in test case 4. This makes an average detection rate of 0.41% across 
all test cases. 
The ‘323’ represents those devices in the intruded network that had experienced high levels 
of both noise and downtime. The ‘323’ had a detection rate of 6.12% in test case 1 and this 













5.4.3.1.2. NaiveBayes Anomaly Detection  
 
Figure 5.16: NaiveBayes Anomaly Network Performance Detection Bar Chart 
The NaiveBayes identified similar detectors as those identified by the MLP. The only 
difference with the NaiveBayes was the detection rate of each detector.  
The ‘333’ had the highest average detection rate of 73.94% slightly lower than the detection 
rate identified by the MLP. The ‘113’ and ‘213’ had an average detection rate of 6.41% and 
7.00%, respectively, while the ‘311’ and ‘323’ had an average detection rate of 8.11% and 
5.78%, respectively. The ‘313’ had the lowest average detection rate of 0.38% across all test 
cases. 
 
5.4.3.1.3. AIRS2 Anomaly Detection 
 
Figure 5.17: AIRS2 Anomaly Network Performance Detection Bar Chart 
The AIRS2 was able to identify 6 detectors similar to those identified by the MLP and 
NaiveBayes algorithms. Again, the difference was in the detection rate of each detector from 
the three algorithms.  
The ‘333’ had an average detection rate of 78.79% this is higher than the detection rate 












6.86% and 0.40%, respectively. The ‘213’ detector was only identified on test case 1 of the 
experiments. The ‘311’ and ‘323’ had an average detection rate of 8.21% and 1.89%, 
respectively. The ‘213’ had the lowest average detection rate of 0.00% across all test cases. 
 
5.4.3.2. Aberrant Behaviour Detection with Intrusion 
5.4.3.2.1. Multilayer Perceptron Aberrant Detection 
 
Figure 5.18: MLP Aberrant Network Behavior Detection Bar Chart 
The MLP was able to identify 6 detectors for aberrant network behaviour when intrusion was 
introduced in the network. Among those identified the ‘313’ had the highest detection rate. In 
test case 1, its detection rate was 96.17%, and this kept decreasing to a 93.40% in test case 4, 
thus having an average detection rate of 95.07% across all test cases.  
The ‘323’ had a detection rate of 1.13% in test case 1; this kept decreasing to a 0.90% in test 
case 4, making an average detection rate of 1.11% across all test cases. This was less than the 
average detection rate of the ‘333’ of 3.78%. In test case 1 the ‘333’ had a detection rate of 
2.67% and as the networks threshold were made more stringent to test case 4, the detection 
rate increased to 4.94% in test case 4.  
The ‘311’, ‘321’ and ‘331’ had the lowest average detection rate of 0.02%, 0.00% and 0.02% 
respectively. 
 













Figure 5.19: NaiveBayes Aberrant Network Behavior Detection Bar Chart 
The NaiveBayes was able to identify 6 aberrant behaviour detectors, similar to those 
identified by the MLP algorithm. The only difference was with the detection rate of each 
detector. The ‘313’ had an average detection rate of 97.38%, in test case 1 it had a detection 
rate of 97.59% and this kept decreasing to a 97.42% in test case 4.  
The ‘333’ had an average detection rate of 1.88%, in test case 1 the detection rate was 1.01% 
and this kept increasing to a 2.28% in test case 4. The ‘311’ had an average detection rate of 
0.58% across all test cases. In test case 1, its detection rate was 1.19% and this kept 
decreasing to a 0.24% in test case 4. 
The ‘323’, ‘331’ and ‘321’ had the lowest average detection rate for aberrant network 
behaviour of 0.10%, 0.05% and 0.00% respectively. 
 
5.4.3.2.3. AIRS2 Aberrant Detection 
 
Figure 5.20: AIRS2 Aberrant Network Behavior Detection Bar Chart 
The AIRS2 was able to identify 12 aberrant behaviour detectors in the intruded network. The 












‘313’ had an average detection rate of 78.27%, in test case 1 the detection rate was 74.46% 
and this kept increasing to an 81.04% in test case 4.  
The second most identified detector was the ‘113’ with an average detection rate of 10.41% 
across all test cases. In test case 1, the detection rate was 12.80% and this kept decreasing to a 
7.88% in test case 4. The ‘311’ followed with an average detection rate of 7.41%. In test 
case1 it had a detection rate of 8.93% and as the network performance threshold were made 
more stringent, the detection rate decreased to 6.63%. 
In test case 1, the ‘213’ had a detection rate of 3.25%. This decreased to 2.84% in test case 2, 
and eventually increased to a 3.42% in test case 4. 
The remaining detectors had an average detection rate less than 0.20% across all test cases. 
This includes detectors: ‘123’, ‘133’, ‘223’, ‘233’, ‘321’, ‘323’, ‘311’ and ‘333’. The ‘321’ 
was not identified in test case 3, and the ‘333’ was only identified in test 4 of the 
experiments. 
5.5. Discussion 
To test the MLP algorithm, Ghosh et al [30] ran experiments for anomaly detection and 
misuse detection, were they used the Lincoln DARPA intrusion detection datasets. In their 
anomaly detection results it was found that the MLP was able to perform with an average true 
positive rate of 77.3% and a false positive rate of 2.2%. 
For misuse detection, the MLP was able to perform at 90.9% true positive rate and false 
positive rate of 18.7%. The author further explained the algorithm’s performance for misuse 
detection as due to the fact that the detection algorithm was trained on data that contained 
both intrusion data and normal data. Researchers have believed that if the non-intrusion data 
is removed from the training data, this will significantly reduce the FP rate. The results reveal 
that MLP is suitable to perform intrusion detection but further developments and 
improvements are required for it to be suitable for commercial use. 
Similar work was conducted by Hofmaan et al in [38]; they ran experiments for the MLP 
algorithm on the Lincoln DARPA intrusion detection dataset. In their results it was revealed 
that on a 5-fold cross validation dataset, the MLP had an overall high classification accuracy 
rate. Similar results were revealed by the MLP experiments conducted for this dissertation. 
In our case study results, the results revealed that the NaiveBayes algorithm’s performance 
was slightly below that of the MLP throughout all the test cases. Similar results were revealed 
by Hall et all in [34] when they applied a Bayesian filtering to an intrusion detection system. 
In their experiments they tested the ability of the Bayesian filter to correctly classify MAC 
address spoofing. The Bayesian filter achieved a 94-100% success rate, similar to that 
experienced in our Wi-Fi network anomaly and aberrant behaviour detection experiments.  
Panda et all in [65] implemented the NaiveBayes algorithm to the KD99 intrusion detection 












99% precision rate and a 99.5% recall rate. These results are slightly similar to those revealed 
by the Wi-Fi Network experiments in this dissertation. 
The authors in [1] ran experiments to compare artificial immune systems algorithms, 
including the AIRS2. The algorithms were applied to a dataset of API call traces of real 
malware and benign processes running on a Windows operating system. The algorithms were 
tested for their ability to correctly classify malware and benign processes. In their experiment 
results the AIRS had a very good performance with average true positive rate of 95%, a false 
positive rate of 0.83%, recall of 98.5% and an F-measure of 96.4%. 
The results from the experiments in [1] display very good algorithm performance, and they 
are better from what was revealed by the AIRS2 in the Wi-Fi network case studies 
experiments for this dissertation. The results in the dissertation were poor when compared to 
those discovered by authors in [1]. This can be attributed to the difference in AIRS2 
parameters that were used in the experiments. In the experiments conducted by authors in [1], 
the ‘Affinity Threshold Scalar’ was set to 0.4, while in our experiments it was set to 0.2. If 
the Affinity Threshold Scalar is low, there will be a low replacement rate of best matching 
memory cells by candidate memory cells, and the reverse is true for higher affinity threshold 
scalar. For our experiments, there needs to be further investigation to determine which 
affinity threshold scalar produces better prediction performance for the AIRS2 algorithm. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
5.6.1. Anomaly Network Performance Detection with Network 
Intrusion 
The statistical tests conducted in the anomaly experiments above reveal that in most 
performance measures there is a significant difference in mean performance for the three 
algorithms. The percent correct classification, Kappa Statistic, TP Rate and Recall between 
the MLP and NaiveBayes, there was not a significant difference in mean performance. 
Therefore we can conclude that the performance measures for all three algorithms are 
statistically different. 
When the bar charts in figure 5.1 to figure 5.7 are carefully examined, one finds out that the 
three algorithms had an impressive excellent accuracy measures. Across all performance 
measures, on average the MLP and NaiveBayes had an average anomaly performance above 
95%, while the AIRS2 algorithm had an average anomaly performance slightly below 90%.  
The bar charts in section 3.1 of the paper reveal that the anomaly data mining capabilities of 
the three algorithms are closely related. Observing the Figures 5.15 to Figure 5.17, the MLP, 
NaiveBayes and AIRS2 algorithms have identified similar and closely related detectors at a 












The three algorithms have proven to be able to correctly classify anomaly performance in an 
intruded network. The MLP was favoured as it had the highest accuracy based on the 
performance measures and statistical tests presented in section 1 of the Results chapter. 
 
5.6.2. Aberrant Network Performance Detection with Intrusion 
In section 2 of the Results chapter the statistical test conducted reveals that there is a 
statistical difference in mean algorithm performance between the three algorithms. Therefore, 
one can safely conclude that for aberrant performance detection in an intruded network, the 
classification accuracy of the MLP, NaiveBayes and AIRS2 algorithms is statistically 
different.  
When the bar charts in figures 5.8 to figure 5.14 are carefully examined, it is found out that 
the MLP and NaiveBayes, on average, had a mediocre performance for aberrant behaviour 
detection in an intruded network. Across all performance measures, on average, the 
performance of MLP and NaiveBayes was below 80% to 65%. Across all performance 
measures, the average performance of the AIRS2 algorithm was below 40%. The AIRS2 
algorithm’s performance measures have shown poor performance for aberrant behaviour 
detection with network intrusion. 
The three algorithms have shown mediocre to poor ability in correctly identifying and 
classifying aberrant behaviour in an intruded network of Wi-Fi hotpots. 
 
5.6.3. Comparing Situation Recognition Before and After Network 
Intrusion 
This section of the dissertation compares performance of the three machine learning 
algorithms on the RedButton network before, and after intrusion was introduced in the 
network. The detection performance is compared for anomaly performance detection, 
aberrant performance detection and the data mining using confusion matrices. 
There are qualitative and quantitative methods available to compare performance for the three 
algorithms on the two case studies; this includes statistical models for hypothesis testing, 
ANOVA tests, Student t-tests and F-tests. For the purposes of this dissertation, we will use 
explanatory data analysis as a qualitative descriptive method to analyse the main 
characteristics of the two case study results, without formulating a hypothesis. We will 
visually examine the results based on Figures 4.5 to 4.24, and Figures 5.1 to 5.20. 
 
5.6.3.1. Anomaly Performance Detection 
For anomaly performance detection before intrusion was introduced in the network, the 












measures and an anomaly False Positive rate of less than 2.00%. The AIRS2 machine 
learning algorithm had an average performance that was below 95.00% across all 
performance measures and a 19.93% False Positive rate. This was the performance of the 
machine learning algorithms before intrusion. This was shown by Figures 4.5 to 4.11. 
Figure 5.1 to figure 5.8 indicate that when intrusion detection was introduced in the network, 
the three machine learning algorithms had a slightly different performance. The NaiveBayes 
and MLP had an average performance that was above 95.00% across all performance 
measures, with an anomaly False Positive rate below 0.28%. The AIRS had an average 
performance that was below 93.00% for all performance measures, with a 12.23% anomaly 
false positive rate.  
When we carefully examine the figures 4.21 to figure 4.23, The NaiveBayes and MLP were 
able to identify similar detectors: ‘113’, ‘123’, ‘131’, ‘213’, ‘231’, ‘311’, ‘313’, but with the 
NaiveBayes identifying more than those the MLP was unable to identify. The AIRS2 was 
able to identify fewer anomaly detectors before intrusion, relative to the MLP and 
NaiveBayes. The detection rates for all detectors were slightly different and varied. 
When intrusion was introduced to the network, confusion matrices were again used for 
performance measuring. The MLP was able to identify the detectors ‘113’, ‘213’, ‘313’, 
‘323’, ‘333’, and the NaiveBayes identified similar detectors, but with an extra ‘311’ detector 
identified. The AIRS2 identified similar detectors as those in NaiveBayes, but with an extra 
‘213’detector identified. Using graphical methods to analyse performance, the detection rate 
of the three algorithms were slightly similar. This is indicated by figures 5.17 to figure 5.20. 
The performance measure comparison results indicate that with intrusion detection 
introduced in the network, the accuracy of the machine learning algorithms has generally 
slightly decreased. 
 
5.6.3.2. Aberrant Performance Detection 
Figures 4.12 to 4.21 indicate that for aberrant performance detection before intrusion was 
introduced in the network, the NaiveBayes and MLP had an average performance level below 
75.00% for all performance measures and a poor aberrant False Positive rate of more than 
58.00%. The AIRS2 machine learning algorithm had an average performance that was below 
60.00% across all performance measures and an impressive average 2.00% False Positive 
rate.  
When intrusion detection was introduced in the network, the three machine learning 
algorithms had a slightly improved performance. The NaiveBayes and MLP had an average 
performance that was above 75.00% across all performance measures, with a poor aberrant 
False Positive rate above 55.00%. The AIRS had an average performance that was above 
55.00% for all performance measures, with an 11.00% anomaly false positive rate. This is 












Before intrusion was introduced in the network, The MLP and NaiveBayes were able to 
identify similar detectors with the exception of the ‘113’, ‘233, and ’313’ detectors. The bar 
charts in Figures 4.24 and 4.25 indicate that the MLP and NaiveBayes had a slightly similar 
detection rate, with the ‘313’ detector having an average detection rate 95.07%. On the other 
hand, the AIRS2 algorithm was able to identify 16 detectors with and addition of eight more 
to those identified by the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. The AIRS2’s detection rate for 
the detectors across all test cases was volatile, this can be explained by the poor performance 
measures that the AIRS2 displayed. 
After intrusion, MLP and NaiveBayes were able to identify similar detectors: ‘331’, ‘313’, 
‘321’, ‘323’, ‘331’, ‘333’. Figures 5.20 and 5.21 indicate that the ‘313’ had an average 
detection rate of 96.33% for both MLP and NaiveBayes. The AIRS2 was able to identify the 
same detectors as those of the MLP and NaiveBayes, but the AIRS2 was able to identify six 
more detectors. The bar chart in figure 5.22 indicates that the detector ‘313’ had a maximum 
detection rate of 81.04%. This is slightly similar to those shown by the MLP and NaiveBayes 
machine learning algorithms. 
When intrusion was introduced into the network, the aberrant performance of the MLP and 
NaiveBayes declined when compared their performance before intrusion detection. The 
AIRS2’s performance has worsened but it has drastically improved its aberrant false positive 
rate performance. The confusion matrices indicate that the aberrant performance of the 
AIRS2 has slightly improved when compared to the case study before intrusion detection was 














6. TROMPSBURG DROUGHT 
MONITORING CASE STUDY 
6.1. Introduction 
Drought is a natural, environmental disaster that can be classified together with earthquakes, 
epidemics and floods. It has substantial impact on humans and its impact can persist for 
several years. A current example of an extreme drought case is that of East Africa. East 
Africa has experienced its worst drought in 60 years, affecting more than 11 million people. 
It was declared famine-stricken region, with overcrowded refugee camps in Kenya and 
Ethiopia. Livestock is dying at a rapid rate, with one farmer reporting have lost 17 goats in 
one day. Officials also warn that over 800 000 children could die from malnutrition across 
East Africa nations of Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya [80]. 
The definition of drought has been a stumbling block for drought monitoring and analysis, as 
drought means various things to various people. In general, drought is a deficiency of 
precipitation relative to what is expected, when extended over a season or a longer period of 
time results in the inability to meet the demands of human activities and the environment 
[36]. The impact of drought is big, it “impacts both surface and groundwater resources and 
can lead to reduced water supply, deteriorated water quality, crop failure reduced range 
productivity, diminished power generation, disturbed riparian habitats, and suspended 
recreation activities, as well as a host of economic and social activities” [61].  
Given the impacts of drought, there is a need for developing strategies for drought monitoring 
and early warning systems that are able to determine drought severity. These systems can 
help in planning and managing water resources, and can help reduce and avoid impacts of 
drought.  
In this study we investigate available drought monitoring tools, and look into the use of 
machine learning algorithms in drought forecasting. Three machine learning algorithms, viz. 
Artificial Immune Systems, Bayesian Networks and Artificial Neural Networks, are studied 
and their performance on a South African precipitation dataset is compared. 
6.2. Background 
6.2.1. Definitions of drought and its classifications 
Drought impacts different people in different ways, and for this matter it has been classified 
into four categories: 
 Meteorological drought: This is the general concept of drought; it is defined as the 
lack of precipitation or rainfall in a particular region over a period of time. 
 Hydrological drought: This refers to a prolonged period of inadequate surface and 












 Agricultural drought: This refers to a prolonged lack of precipitation that leads to 
declined soil moisture that adversely affects crop production.  
 Socio-economic drought: This is drought-associated to the demand and supply of 
economic good, water, when available water resource systems are unable to meet the 
demand for water. 
 
6.2.2. Drought Indices 
Research in previous years has developed indices that measure drought. These indices can be 
used in early warning and drought monitoring systems. These indices are very important in 
measuring the drought severity, intensity, duration, coverage and magnitude. These indices 
are discussed in the section below. 
6.2.2.1. Percent Normal Precipitation 
This index is calculated using precipitation. It is a percentage ratio of current precipitation to 
a (normally) 30-year average precipitation [32]. It falls short in that it does not allow 
comparison between different locations [86]. 
6.2.2.2. Crop Moisture Index 
This is an index used in crop-producing regions. It evaluates short-term moisture conditions 
by using weekly values of temperature and precipitation. It has shortfalls in that it has 
unnatural changes in temperature due “to the dependence of the abnormal evapotranspiration 
term on the magnitude of potential evapotranspiration” [61]. It is not good for long-term 
drought monitoring as its rapid responses to changing short-term conditions provide 
misleading information about long-term conditions [61, 86]. 
6.2.2.3. Standard Precipitation Index 
The standard Precipitation Index (SPI) is a probability index that is calculated using long-
term precipitation. It can be calculated on different time scales allowing both short-term (soil 
moisture) and long-term (water resource systems) monitoring. Details of this drought 
monitoring index are discussed in the next section. 
6.2.2.4. Palmer Drought Severity Index 
The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) is used to measure drought severity over a long-
term period. It is calculated using three variables, viz. temperature, soil moisture and 
precipitation. It has been well tested and in use for a long period of time, and allows 
comparison of different climatic zones. According to [61], the rules used to establish PDSI’s 
are arbitrary and its limitations have been documented in several studies. “Limitations of 
PDSI include: (1) an inherent time scale making PDSI more suitable for agricultural impacts 
and not so much for hydrologic droughts, (2) assumptions that all precipitation is rain, thus 
making values during winter months and at high elevations often questionable. PDSI also 












underestimation of runoff, and (3) PDSI can be slow to respond to developing and 
diminishing droughts” [61].  
6.2.2.5. Conclusion 
The authors in [61] have made great attempts to make comparisons and find out which of the 
drought indices are most suitable for drought monitoring. They ran a workshop in which 
delegates over across 22 countries were to develop a consensus standard index for each type 
of drought. This was in the efforts to develop guidelines to help explore drought indices that 
may have global applications. In this workshop, they listed the relevant indices and evaluated 
them according to the following criteria: 
 Regions were the indices are used. 
 The type of drought being monitored. 
 How indices are used. 
 Advantages and disadvantages. 
 Overall general usefulness. 
For most of the discussions and work presented at this workshop, (more specifically) the SPI 
and PDSI was the most recommended for monitoring.  
The comparison between SPI and PDSI came out with the following results: 
i. “Special characteristics of PDI vary from site to site while those of SPI do not vary 
from site to site. Also, PDI has a complex structure with an exceptionally long 
memory, while SPI is an easily interpreted, simple moving average process. 
Therefore, SPI can be used as the primary drought index, because it is simple, 
spatially invariant in its interpretation, and probabilistic, so it can be used in risk and 
decision analysis” [32]. 
ii. “SPI is more representative of short-term precipitation than PDSI and thus is a better 
indicator for soil moisture variation and soil wetness” [76]. 
iii. “SPI is a better predictor of crop production, as it represents the moisture state of soil 
better” [68]. 
iv. “SPI provides a better spatial standardization than does PDSI with respect to extreme 
drought events” [52]. 
v. It was found out that the SPI was a valuable estimator for drought severity [61]. 
vi. SPI detects the onset of a drought earlier than PDSI [35]. 
Based on this, it can be inferred that the SPI is a better monitoring tool to use. We will 
therefore focus on the SPI for the remainder of this case study. The section that follows will 













6.3. Standard Precipitation Index (SPI) 
6.3.1. Background of SPI 
The SPI was developed by McKee et al. in 1993[56]. The standard Precipitation Index (SPI) 
is a probability index that is calculated using long-term precipitation. It can be calculated on 
different time scales allowing both short-term (soil moisture) and long-term (water resource 
systems) monitoring. It is a simple drought monitor index tool that takes in one parameter for 
its computation, long term precipitation data. “This long-term record is fitted into a 
probability distribution, which is then transformed to a normal distribution so that the mean 
SPI for the location and desired period is zero [56]. Its strength lies in the fact that it can be 
calculated for different time scales, from 3  24 months. This allows one to monitor and use 
for different domains. The authors in [61] talks about the different time scales for different 
domains of drought monitoring, saying that SPI can “monitor short-term water supplies, such 
as soil moisture which is important for agricultural production, and long-term water 
resources, such as groundwater supplies, stream flow, and lake and reservoir levels. Soil 
moisture conditions respond to precipitation anomalies on a relatively short scale. 
Groundwater, stream flow, and reservoir storage reflect the long-term precipitation 
anomalies”.  
SPI values have range -3 to 3. Positive SPI values indicate greater than median precipitation, 
and negative values indicate less than median precipitation. Because the SPI is normalised, 
wetter and drier climates can be represented in the same way, and wet periods can also be 
monitored using the SPI. The table 6.1 below represents the values of SPI and how they are 
classified, and the percentage occurrence.  
Table 6.1: SPI Classification and Corresponding Probabilities of Occurrence [56, 57] 
 
 
6.3.2. Calculating SPI 
SPI is uniquely related to probability; it is calculated by “fitting a probability density function 
to the frequency distribution of precipitation summed over a time scale of interest. Each 
probability density function is the transformed into the standardised normal distribution” 
[60]. The probability density function of the gamma distribution is: 
SPI Value Drought Category Occurrence
2.00 and above Extremely Wet 2.3%
1.50 to 1.99 Very Wet 4.4%
1.00 to 1.49 Moderately Wet 9.2%
-0.99 to 0.99 Near Normal 68.2%
-1.00 to -1.49 Moderately Dry 4.4%
-1.50 to -1.99 Severely Dry 9.2%
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Where     represents the shape parameter;     is a scale parameter, and     is the 
amount of precipitation.      is the gamma function, which is defined as [40, 40, 40, 52]:  
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The two parameters must be estimated and to get the optimum parameters, the maximum 
likelihood method is used: 
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Where for n observations 
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This process is repeated until the algorithm converges. Integrating the probability function 
yields an expression for the cumulative probability      of an observed amount of 
precipitation occurring for a given month and time scale: 
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When substituting   for    ̂ the equation above is reduced to an incomplete gamma function: 
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Since the gamma distribution is undefined for values    , and a distribution may contain 
zeroes,                       is the probability of zero precipitation, the 
cumulative probability becomes: 
                 
The cumulative probability      is then transformed into a standard normal random variable 













6.4. Related Work 
There has been creditable work done to predict weather condition using Bayesian Networks, 
and in [46] they were applied to the problem of predicting sea breeze. Bayesian Networks 
were then compared with existing rule-based system and it was found that the Bayesian 
network outperformed the traditional rule-based system in prediction accuracy.  
The authors in [4] introduced a Bayesian Network framework that deals with multivariate 
spatiality distributed time series. They used it to predict precipitation for 100 stations in the 
North basin of the Iberian Peninsula during winter of 1999. In [19], Bayesian networks are 
used to estimate forecasts of peak and average temperatures. In this case study, data derived 
from a power utility system is used to forecast electric load with imperfect information. 
Considerable weather forecast work has focused on the use of artificial neural networks and 
Bayesian Networks, but only a few use artificial immune systems for weather forecasting. 
The authors in [93] implemented an immune-based algorithm that was applied on weather 
data for forecasting. The immune algorithm was compared to an artificial neural network 
algorithm and the results reveal that the implemented immune algorithm had a higher forecast 
accuracy rate than that of the neural network.  
There has also been great work done in drought monitoring using artificial neural networks. 
[3] used feed-forward ANN with multilayer perceptions (MLP) for empirical model 
development using seven climatic variables (monthly mean air temperature, monthly mean 
daily minimum and maximum air temperature, monthly mean relative humidity, monthly 
precipitation, monthly mean global solar irradiation and monthly potential 
evapotranspiration).  
Authors in [60] used a record of SPI time series data and linear stochastic models 
(ARIMA/SARIMA), recursive multistep neural networks (DMSNN) for drought forecasting 
in the Kansabiti river basin, which lies in the Purulia district of West Bengal, India. In their 
comparison they found neural networks to be more suitable for drought forecasting. The 
authors in [73] used a temporal back-propagation neural network (TBP-NN) for monthly 
rainfall-runoff modelling in scarce data conditions. 
In this study, we would like to investigate the performance of the three machine learning 
algorithms in the aim to answer the following questions: 
 Which method performs better? 
 How do the methods perform across different SPI time scales? 













6.5. Research Methods 
6.5.1. Drought Monitoring Region and Data Collection 
The region of monitoring is Trompsburg, Free State, South Africa. Trompsburg is a small 
town located in the southern Free State. It is in the ecotone between Nama-Karoo and the 
grassland biome. The main land use in the region is livestock farming, especially sheep and 
cattle farming. Frequency of drought is predicted to increase in that region. Annual rainfall 
for the last 95 years has remained unchanged. Weather monitoring data was collected from 
this region by the South African Weather Services, but for the purposes of this study, the 
main focus was on this regions precipitation. Monthly precipitation data for this region was 
collected for the years January 1913 to May 2009, making a total of 96 years of observations. 
 
6.5.2. Test Cases 
In the literature reviewed above, it was found that there are four different types of drought: 
meteorological, hydrological, agricultural, and socio-economic droughts. Using Standard 
Precipitation Index (SPI) allows the monitoring of different types of drought using different 
time scales [40, 56, 57, 60, 61].  
This case study will focus on the following time scales: SPI 3 months, SPI 6 months, SPI 12 
months and SPI 24 months for the Trompsburg region. 
 
6.5.3. Experiment Design 
The data provided for the Trompsburg region was precipitation data. We had to transform 
and calculate the data into precipitation data in such a way that we can create training and 
testing dataset. The steps taken for completing the experiments in this study are shown below 
by figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: Trompsburg Experiment 
1. The data is prepared into text files for further processing 
2. Data cleansing and Analysis: Data is checked for any missing data. If there is missing 












3. A Java program that is designed for calculating the monthly SPI when given time- 
scale inputs and monthly precipitation data. This program can be found and 
downloaded from the Greenleaf website
1
. 
4. The output files are produced by the Java Program for time scales 3, 6, 12 and 24. 
5. The data is then used by the Weka program to test performance measures using the 
AIS, ANN and BNN algorithms. 
In Weka, the 10-fold cross validation technique was used, and for each of the four test cases, 
the experiments were iterated 10 times. The mean algorithm performance measures of each 
experiment’s iteration were recorded and used for comparison. In total we had 400 
observations for statistical comparisons. The results for the Trompsburg drought experiment 
follows in the section below. In the evaluation, bar charts graphical techniques and t-test 
statistics are used. 
 
6.6. Experiment Results  
The results that follow are from a study conducted to assess the ability of the algorithms 
MLP, NaiveBayes and AIRS2 for data mining on a South African Standard Precipitation 
Index drought case study. The algorithms are assessed based on the following algorithm 
performance measures: Kappa Statistic, True Positive Rate, False Positive Rate, Precision, 
Recall, F-measure, ROC Area and a confusion matrix. 
The chapter presents statistical hypothesis test which were conducted for each algorithm 


















6.6.1. Kappa Statistic Performance 
 
Figure 6.2: SPI Kappa Statistic Performance Bar Chart 
Across all SPI test cases, the MLP had an average Kappa statistic of 13.99%, while that of the 
NaiveBayes was 0.22%. The NaiveBayes had a below zero Kappa statistic for SPI12 and 
SPI24 test cases, this is indicated by Figure 6.3 above. The AIRS2 had an average kappa 
statistic of 2.28%, and in the test case SPI6, the Kappa statistic was -0.45%.  
 
Table 6.2: Results for Kappa Statistic T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Kappa Statistic: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Kappa Statistic: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 1.865 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.0628. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is not statistically significant and there is weak evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that the difference in the mean Kappa statistic for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms 
equals zero, the hypothesised mean. 












Kappa Statistic: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Kappa Statistic: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -0.516 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.605. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is not statistically significant and there is little to no evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that the difference in mean Kappa statistic for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms equals zero, 
the hypothesised mean. 
 
6.6.2. True Positive Rate Performance 
 
Figure 6.3: SPI True Positive Rate Performance Bar Chart 
Figure 6.4 indicates that across all test cases, the MLP had an average true positive rate of 
69.38%, while the NaiveBayes’ was slightly lower at 68.75%. The AIRS2 had an even lower 
average true positive rate performance of 56.30%. Amongst all time scales, the time scale for 
SPI12 had the high performance for all algorithms. The MLP had a performance of 70.70% 
and the NaiveBayes had a performance of 70.60% while the AIRS2 had a performance of 
57.50%. 
 













For the test: 
True Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
True Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -2.557 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.0109. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is significant and there is strong evidence to infer that the alternative hypothesis 
is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a difference in the 
mean true positive rate for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. 
For the test: 
True Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
True Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 60.501 and its two-tailed p-value is 4.2428E-203. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a difference in mean true positive rate for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
6.6.3. False Positive Rate Performance 
 
Figure 6.4: SPI False Positive Rate Performance Bar Chart 
The average Positive Rate for the MLP was 69.38% across all SPI test cases, while that of the 
NaiveBayes was slightly lower at 68.63%. The AIRS2 had an impressive lower average false 













Table 6.4: Results for False Positive Rate T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
False Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
False Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -4.036 and its two-tailed p-value is 6.4956E-05. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a difference in the mean false positive rate for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. 
For the test: 
False Positive Rate: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
False Positive Rate: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 50.527 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.728E-175. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 













6.6.4. Precision Performance 
 
Figure 6.5: SPI Precision Performance Bar Chart 
The bar chart in Figure 6.6 indicates that the MLP had an average precision performance of 
48.18%, while that of the NaiveBayes was slightly higher at 48.55%, across all test cases. 
The average precision rate performance of the AIRS2 was 50.70%, slightly higher than that 
of both the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. The bar chart in Figure 6.6 indicates, for all 
algorithms, there are increasing trend in precision, from test case SPI3-SPI12, then a sudden 
decrease in precision for test case SPI24. For all time scales, the precision performance for 
both the MLP and NaiveBayes was below 50% while that of the AIRS2 was slightly above 
50%. The time scale SPI12 had a better performance over other time scales. 
 
Table 6.5: Results for Precision T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Precision: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Precision: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 4.537 and its two-tailed p-value is 7.55381E-06. At 5% 












alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a difference in the mean precision for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. 
For the test: 
Precision: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Precision: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -8.041 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.01703E-14. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a difference in mean precision for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
6.6.5. Recall Performance 
 
Figure 6.6: SPI Recall Performance Bar Chart 
The average SPI recall performance of the MLP was 69.38%, across all test cases, while that 
of the NaiveBayes was slightly lower at 68.75%. The AIRS2 had an average SPI recall 
performance of 56.30%. This is shown by the bar chart in figure 6.7. Amongst all SPI time 
scales, classifications for the SPI12 produced higher recall performance for all algorithms. 
The MLP, NaiveBayes and AIRS2 had performance of 70.70%, 70.60% and 57.50%, 













Table 6.6:Results for Recall T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
Recall: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
Recall: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -2.557 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.0109. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is significant and there is strong evidence to infer that the alternative hypothesis 
is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a difference in the 
mean recall for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. 
For the test: 
Recall: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
Recall: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 60.501 and its two-tailed p-value is 4.2428E-203. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 













6.6.6. F-Measure Performance 
 
Figure 6.7: SPI F-Measure Performance Bar Chart 
The bar chart in figure 6.8 indicate that the MLP had an average SPI F-measure performance 
of 56.85%, and that of the NaiveBayes was slightly lower at 56.78%. The AIRS2 algorithm 
had a lower average SPI F-measure performance of 53.18%. Figure 6.8’s bar chart again 
indicates a trend that, for all algorithms, from test cases SPI3-SPI12, there is an increasing or 
improving f-measure performance, but there is a sudden decline in f-measure performance for 
test case SPI24. When compared to other times scales. The SPI12 time scale produced higher 
F-measure performance. The MLP, NaiveBayes and the AIRS2 had a performance of 
58.60%, 58.50% and 54.60%, respectively, for the SPI12 time scale. 
 
Table 6.7: Results for F-Measure T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
F-Measure: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
F-Measure: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 1.456 and its two-tailed p-value is 0.146. At 5% confidence 
level, the test is not statistically significant and there is little or no evidence to infer that the 












that the difference in the mean recall for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms equals zero, 
the hypothesised mean. 
For the test: 
F-Measure: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
F-Measure: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 28.623 and its two-tailed p-value is 9.3881E-99. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a difference in mean recall for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
6.6.7. ROC Area 
 
Figure 6.8: SPI ROC Area Performance Bar Chart 
The bar chart in figure 6.9 indicates that the average SPI ROC area performance for the MLP 
was 50.73%, while that of the NaiveBayes was slightly higher at 53.60%. The AIRS2 had an 
average SPI ROC Area performance of 51.05%. For MLP, the higher ROC Area performance 
was noticed with time scale SPI12 of 52.40%. The NaiveBayes in SPI 24 had a higher ROC 














Table 6.8: Results for ROC Area T-test for Paired Two Samples for Means 
 
For the test: 
ROC Area: H0: µMLP - µNaiveBayes = 0 
ROC Area: H1: µMLP - µNaiveBayes ≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is -4.722 and its two-tailed p-value is 3.23199E-06. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a difference in the mean recall for the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. 
For the test: 
ROC Area: H0: µMLP - µAIRS2 = 0 
ROC Area: H1: µMLP - µAIRS2≠ 0 
The value of the t-Statistic is 8.974 and its two-tailed p-value is 1.12846E-17. At 5% 
confidence level, the test is significant and there is overwhelming evidence to infer that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is a difference in mean recall for the MLP and AIRS2 algorithms. 
 
6.6.8. Confusion Matrix 
The section that follows uses confusion matrices to assess the ability of the MLP, 
NaiveBayes and AIRS2 algorithms to make correct classifications. Confusion matrices for all 
four test cases are discussed. 
 













Table 6.9: Multilayer Perceptron Confusion Matrices for (a) SPI3 and (b) SPI6 Test Cases 
 
 
Table 6.10: Multilayer Perceptron Confusion Matrices for (c) SPI12 and (d) SPI24 Test Cases 
 
When working with a confusion matrix, good results corresponds to large numbers on the 
main diagonal and small, ideally zero, off-diagonal elements. In table 6.10(a, b) and 6.11 (a, 
b), the main diagonals elements are zeroes, except for the first column. The column indicates 
the predicted class, and most predictions fell into the first column class ‘Near_Normal’. This 
is an indication that the MLP algorithm was biased to predicting most instances as ‘Near 
Normal’. This can help understand and explain the poor algorithm performance measures 













6.6.8.2. NaiveBayes Algorithm 
Table 6.11: NaiveBayes Confusion Matrices for (a) SPI3 and (b) SPI6 Test Cases 
 
 
Table 6.12: Multilayer Perceptron Confusion Matrices for (c) SPI12 and (d) SPI24 Test Cases 
 
The tables 6.12(a, b) and 6.13(c, d) are NaiveBayes algorithm’s confusion matrices for test 
cases SPI3 to SPI24 test experiments. The confusion matrices indicate that across the main 
diagonal are zero values, except for the first column. The first column indicates the predicted 
class, and for most instances, there NaiveBayes algorithm predicted the class ‘Near_Normal’. 
This serves as a sign that the NaiveBayes algorithm was biased towards predicting a 
‘Near_Normal’ class. This can well help us understand and explain the poor performance 













6.6.8.3. AIRS2 Algorithm 
Table 6.13: AIRS2 Confusion Matrices for (a) SPI3 and (b) SPI6 Test Cases 
 
 
Table 6.14: AIRS2 Confusion Matrices for (c) SPI12 and (d) SPI24 Test Cases 
 
The tables 6.14(a, b) and 6.15(c, d)  are the AIRS2’s confusion matrices for test cases SPI3-
SPI24 test experiments. The AIRS2’s confusion matrices had fewer zeroes along the main 
diagonal in comparison to the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithms. The may have been fewer 
zeroes on the main diagonal, but the values were very low, making us draw a similar 
conclusion as that of the MLP and NaiveBayes algorithm. The values in the first columns of 
the confusion matrices are indicative that the AIRS2 was also biased towards predicting most 
instances as ‘Near_Normal’. This helps us explain the poor performance measures of the 














Saeid et al [63] performed an investigation where they used EDI and SPI on a number of 
ANN algorithms. The algorithms were tested on several rainfall stations in the Tehran 
Province of Iran. In their experiments they use time scales 3, 6, 9 and 12 for SPI. In their test 
results it was found that the ANN had a 70% to 85% correct classification of SPI with lead 
time 6 months. For SPI with lead time of 9 months, the ANN had correct classification of 
59% to 80% for all test cases. For SPI with lead time 12 months, the ANN had correct 
classification that ranged between 54-62%. The results revealed by Saed et al [63] are slightly 
similar to those MLP in the drought case study. 
For the NaiveBayes algorithms, Liu et al [51] ran experiments on a set of meteorological data 
collected from the Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters. In their experiments they found 
that the NaiveBayes classifier had an overall classification performance ranging between 
65.22% and 88.77% for all the test cases. In their experiments they did not use SPI as they 
used several attributes like wind, speed, temperature and humidity (just to mention a few). 
The results they revealed were slightly better than those revealed by the Trompsburg case 
study of this dissertation. This may be due to choice of parameters for classifying rainfall and 
precipitation. 
Peng et al. [67] tested the AIRS2 algorithm on four famous datasets, the Iris, Ionosphere, 
Diabetes and Sonar datasets. In their experiments it was found that the AIRS2 had a 
classification accuracy ranging from 74.2%-96.0% across all test cases. The authors also 
noted that when the AIRS2 algorithm’s performance is compared to some traditional 
methods, the AIRS2 had lower classification accuracy. These are similar trends in 
performance that were experienced in the case studies presented in the dissertation. 
Throughout all the case studies the performance of the AIRS2 is not as good as that of the 
MLP and the NaiveBayes. 
6.8. Conclusion 
The statistical experiments conducted above for algorithm performance measures indicate 
that the mean Kappa statistic for the MLP, NaiveBayes and AIRS2 algorithms were 
statistically similar. The mean F-measure for the MLP and NaiveBayes were also statistically 
similar. 
Overall, across all performance measures, one can then safely conclude that there was a 
significant difference in mean algorithm performance measures for the MLP, NaiveBayes and 
AIRS2 algorithms. 
When the bar charts in Figures 6.2 to 6.9 are carefully examined, one finds that the three 
algorithms had a mediocre to poor classification performance. The average rate for most 
performance measures was below 65% and in some cases, 15%. This is indicative that the 


























The rapid development of computing hardware and software has made capturing and storing 
data fairly easy and inexpensive [62]. When monitoring activities from domains such as 
network management, drought & climate observations, and crisis management, one is faced 
with large numbers of devices producing and collecting data from various sources of 
information. The available and inexpensive means of data storage have made possible the 
collection in real-time of large volumes of data. This has raised the need for data mining 
techniques to perform live performance monitoring and analysis of data. Building upon the 
emergence of soft computing methods and techniques in data mining, this dissertation has 
identified and applied three of the most known soft computing techniques, viz. Artificial 
Immune Systems (AIS), Bayesian Networks (BN) and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) to 
three scenarios: Wi-Fi network monitoring, Network Intrusion detection and Drought 
Monitoring. This was with the aim of investigating how the three methods perform for the 
three datasets, and finding which of the three methods are better suited for use in each of the 
case study scenarios. 
In the RedButton Wi-Fi network monitoring case study, for anomaly and aberrant behaviour 
in network performance detection, it was found that there is a significant statistical difference 
in performance among the three soft computing techniques. The BN was able to identify 
more detectors than the ANN, but ANN performed detection with much higher correctness in 
classification, accuracy and precision. The AIS displayed poor performance for anomaly 
detection in network monitoring. 
Intrusion was then introduced into the RedButton’s network dataset, and the computing 
techniques were again assessed. This formed part of the second cases study for the 
dissertation. The assessment revealed as compared to the case without intrusion, the 
performance for the soft computing techniques have decreased after intrusion was introduced 
in the network. The results revealed a highly significant statistical difference in performance 
for the three techniques. The ANN performed better than the BN and the AIS. Its 
performance was higher in term of it correctness in classification, accuracy and precision. 
This reveals the effect of intrusion on the soft computing techniques, as they slightly declined 
in accuracy of classification.  
The third case study of the dissertation was on drought monitoring in Trompsburg in the Free 
State in South Africa. This was conducted in the effort to find out the difference in algorithm 
performance and which of the three methods are better suited for drought monitoring. The 
results from the investigation revealed that there was not enough statistical difference in 
performance for the Kappa statistic performance of the algorithms; and again there was 
statistical similarity in F-measure algorithm performance among the ANN and BN 
techniques. Overall, when the performance of the three algorithms was assessed, one found 
that the overall performance was not satisfactory, with an average correctness and accuracy 
of just above 60%. In terms of computation performance and accuracy, 60% can be classified 












The performance of the algorithms tested in this thesis can be partially explained by the effect 
that the dataset size and feature selection technique has on the performance of an algorithm. 
This was investigated by Catal et al in [9]. In their experiments they tested nine classifier 
algorithms on five publicly available NASA datasets for software fault prediction. 
The NaiveBayes and the MLP algorithms were amongst the nine algorithms that were tested 
in their experiments. In their results it was found that the NaiveBayes does not perform as 
well as the Random Forest Classifier on large datasets, but it produces better accuracy 
performance when applied on small datasets. It is well-known that machine learning 
algorithms perform better when datasets are large, but this was not the case for the 
NaiveBayes in these experiments. 
For large datasets, it was found that the AIRS2 algorithm had lower classification accuracy, 
and these are similar results that were revealed in the three case study experiments.  
Future Work 
Future direction of the work may include: 
 Drought monitoring: The soft computing techniques used for experimentation in this 
dissertation proved to be inefficient in drought monitoring. They revealed poor 
performance. This call for a further investigation into finding soft computing 
techniques that can be used for drought monitoring. 
 Pollution monitoring: There is an interest in the climate change, and there have been 
sensors like the Waspmote XBee, with Gas Sensor board extension and GPS location 
module. The data collected from these sensors can be valuable in climate change 
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